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ABSTRACT 
  The evaluation of judges, especially circuit court judges, has 
commanded increased attention, with the quantitative analyses of 
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati. However, the proper dimensions for 
the evaluation of judges remains much disputed. Critics have 
challenged Choi & Gulati’s scales for measuring judicial quality but 
have offered little that is positive that would improve measurement. 
The critics make philosophical challenges to whether the measures 
truly capture the qualities of judging we should desire, but they offer 
no measurement tools to improve on Choi and Gulati. 
  We hope to advance the theoretical and empirical evaluation by 
incorporating different scales for evaluating judges. We consider Choi 
& Gulati’s data, plus the record of each judge’s opinions on review at 
the Supreme Court and other more subjective measures of judicial 
quality. We then employ a cluster analysis to differentiate among 
different types of judges on all these dimensions. This analysis does 
not provide a rating of the “best” judges, because the standards for 
“best” judging are contested. Some judges may be considered best, 
because their opinions receive more citations. However, these very 
judges may be considered less than best, because they render 
unnecessarily expansive decisions that yield more citations. Some 
argue for judges with minimalist decisionmaking characteristics that 
tend to result in fewer citations. Our cluster analysis simply 
categorizes circuit court judges into groups with like decisionmaking 
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characteristics. This enables an analysis of which group, or type of 
judge, should be considered “best.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rigorous comparative evaluation of federal judges has 
become a popular topic in academic research; the topic’s popularity 
can be traced in large part to a series of articles written by Professors 
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati evaluating federal circuit court of 
appeals judges as candidates for Supreme Court appointment.1 Their 
research has already generated a considerable amount of analytical 
research specific to their model, some of it critiquing their methods or 
conclusions.2 Yet these critiques often overlook some important 
 
 1. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & 
Gulati, Choosing the Next]; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking 
the Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19 (2005) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Mr. Justice 
Posner?]; Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Essay, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 
(2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, A Tournament]. 
 2. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Merit vs. Ideology, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 353, 353–54 
(2005); William P. Marshall, Be Careful What You Wish for: The Problems with Using Empirical 
Rankings to Select Supreme Court Justices, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 119–21 (2004); WERL, On 
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issues, and they have generally failed to add any meaningful 
descriptive data to inform the debate commenced by Choi and Gulati. 
This Article strives to advance the analysis by reanalyzing the issues 
and adding new empirical information for the evaluation of judges. 
Like most of the other existing research, we focus on the federal 
circuit court judiciary. Professors Choi and Gulati chose to evaluate 
these judges because the federal appellate judiciary is the most likely 
source for Supreme Court appointments.3 In addition, the circuit 
court judiciary is probably the single most important level of the 
federal judiciary in light of its extensive caseload and policy making 
authority.4 Given the limited resources of Supreme Court review, the 
circuit courts “are largely left to themselves” to develop “legal rules 
in unsettled areas of law.”5 There is thus great value in understanding 
the relative quality of circuit court judges as these appointments, in 
the aggregate, are arguably more important for most federal court 
cases than any individual appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In Part I, we review the background research on judicial quality. 
The Choi and Gulati study is our benchmark as it investigates the 
quality of federal appeals court judges in great detail and has received 
considerable attention and assessment. In Part I we also review and 
evaluate several critiques of this study’s methodology and usage. The 
methodological disputes raised in these critiques are central to any 
evaluation of the worth of this or any other quantitative measures of 
judicial quality. The Choi and Gulati study is not the only quantitative 
evaluation of circuit court judges, and therefore we also review 
several other approaches that have been taken to this project. 
 
Tournaments for Appointing Great Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 
157–58 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue 1–2 (U. San Diego Legal Studies, 
Research Paper No. 05-16, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=588322. The Choi and 
Gulati tournament has spawned a symposium for an entire issue of a law review. Symposium, 
Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1001 (2005). Their research 
has also been discussed in the Chronicle of Higher Education. David Glenn, Jousting with 
Gavels, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 23, 2003, at A16. 
 3. See Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 1, at 26 n.2. 
 4. See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 1–2 (2007) 
(“[T]he circuit courts are much more important [than the Supreme Court] in setting and 
enforcing the law of the United States.”); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and 
Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2005) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court reviews only a minute percentage . . . of court of appeals decisions. Entire fields 
of law are left mainly to the courts of appeals to shape.”). 
 5. DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 51 
(2002). 
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Part II introduces new criteria for evaluating circuit court judges, 
criteria that were used in connection with the appointment of Samuel 
Alito to the Supreme Court.6 We examine the success of circuit court 
judges on Supreme Court review, quantifying how often the Court 
reversed or affirmed their opinions and decisions. This provides a 
metric that yields different results from those provided by Professors 
Choi and Gulati. The judges with the highest quality score for outside 
circuit citations (the measure pioneered by Choi and Gulati) did not 
tend to have greater success when the Supreme Court reviewed their 
decisions. Because Supreme Court success seems related to judicial 
quality for circuit court judges, this suggests that the earlier quality 
measures require more scrutiny before their accuracy may be 
presumed. 
In Part III, we consider the different types of judges who serve 
on the circuit courts, using a variety of sources including our results 
on Supreme Court reversals, Choi and Gulati’s quality measure, and 
other available measures reflecting circuit judge prestige and quality. 
Prior research shows that judges’ role orientations differ. In Part III, 
therefore, we differentiate between judicial entrepreneurs and 
judicial minimalists and discuss how prior evaluations of judicial 
quality may actually capture a judicial role orientation rather than 
some element associated with intrinsic quality. We address the effect 
of judicial role orientation through a use of cluster analysis, which is a 
statistical tool for grouping observations with shared characteristics. 
In this way, we can identify categories of judges who may share 
similar approaches to the judicial role. 
Part IV suggests directions for further important research on 
circuit court judges. A measure of judicial quality or judicial type can 
be very useful to future analyses of judicial decisionmaking. Such a 
measure can help define the characteristics of judicial decisionmaking 
by identifying judges who are especially ideological or deferential. 
The results can then be used to assist decisionmakers appoint judges 
of the sort society desires. 
 
 6. See Adam Liptak & Jonathan D. Glater, Alito’s Dissents Show Deference to Lower 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at A1 (referencing this study’s findings on Supreme Court 
treatment of Alito’s circuit court decisions). 
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I.  CHOI AND GULATI’S TOURNAMENT AND OTHER EVALUATIONS 
Various researchers over the years have undertaken to measure 
judicial caliber empirically, but Professors Stephen Choi and Mitu 
Gulati have produced the most prominent and important measure, 
which they initially styled as involving a “tournament” of judges.7 In 
this tournament, they created criteria to evaluate circuit court judges 
for promotion and applied those criteria to extensive data they 
collected on contemporary circuit court judges. They produced 
ordered results identifying the best judges on several scales. 
A. Choi and Gulati’s Methods and Results 
Professors Choi and Gulati designed a disciplined system to 
evaluate circuit court judges for purposes of future Supreme Court 
appointments by first identifying factors considered relevant to 
judicial quality, then gathering data to measure those elements. They 
then adjusted their data to compare the scales and select the top 
judges. 
 Choi and Gulati measured the circuit court judges for 
“productivity, quality, and independence.”8 The productivity standard 
measures the number of published opinions the circuit court judge 
wrote during the time period in absolute number and adjusted to 
account for differing caseload and publication norms in each circuit 
court. The quality measure seeks to identify the judges who write the 
highest-quality opinions by measuring the relative number of citations 
to those opinions by other judges. In particular, Choi and Gulati 
focused on citations outside the judge’s own circuit to avoid the biases 
of specific intracircuit effects, on citations to the judge’s top opinions, 
and on invocations of the judge’s name in other opinions. As for 
independence, the authors measured the frequency with which judges 
disagreed with appointees of the same political party. This standard 
measures in significant part the judge’s willingness to separately 
concur or dissent, but it also measures the likelihood that a judge will 
dissent from (or concur with) an appointee of the same party, which 
demonstrates ideological as well as decisional independence. 
The authors base their scales on circuit court opinions written 
between 1998 and 2000 for each of their scales and found, as a general 
result, that Judges Posner and Easterbrook of the United States 
 
 7. See Choi & Gulati, A Tournament, supra note 1. 
 8. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 1, at 33. 
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dominated the measures. 
Other judges, however, had higher independence scores.9 
Nevertheless, when the scores were weighted to account for different 
criteria, Posner and Easterbrook became quite dominant.10 
B. Use of the Results for Supreme Court Appointments 
Professors Choi and Gulati’s initial article on the subject 
proposed a tournament “where the reward to the winner is elevation 
to the Supreme Court.”11 Although the title of their subsequent article 
suggests that their results could be used to choose Supreme Court 
Justices, they concede that this is unlikely to occur and that it, indeed, 
was not their ultimate objective.12 Instead, they propose that the 
results could at least influence the choice of Justices through their 
persuasive effect and potential political use.13 Nevertheless, various 
reviewers have criticized the Choi and Gulati research, at least as 
applied to the selection of Justices. Regardless of this debate, we 
believe it may have greater value in other uses, especially in the 
context of academic research on judicial behavior. 
The Choi and Gulati study prompted a flurry of follow-up 
analyses. Numerous articles were written on the authors’ 
methodology and the proposed use of their results. Although much of 
the commentary on the Choi and Gulati tournament have been quite 
positive, the commentators have made a number of very specific 
criticisms. These criticisms fall into two main categories: disputes 
about the accuracy of their measures of judicial characteristics 
(methodology critiques) and disputes about whether those measures 
are suitable for the selection of Supreme Court Justices (usage 
critiques). 
1. Particularized Methodology Critiques.  One set of criticisms of 
the tournament involves the methodology used to assign “virtue” to 
circuit court judges. The productivity, quality, and independence 
scales used by Professors Choi and Gulati are all relatively objective 
 
 9. Id. at 68–69. 
 10. Id. at 73. 
 11. Choi & Gulati, A Tournament, supra note 1, at 299. 
 12. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 1, at 38. 
 13. Professors Choi and Gulati suggest that their standards “enable transparency in the 
nomination process” and create a “de facto presumption—one that the president has to rebut 
(or else face public pressure to the extent that the tournament’s objective winners are easy to 
observe).” Id. at 81. 
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assessments, but according to critics, they incorporate subjective 
evaluations. Some have questioned whether the three criteria truly 
capture praiseworthy characteristics in the judiciary. Others have 
accepted the value of the criteria but question whether the authors’ 
quantitative measures truly capture the relevant concepts. 
Although the judicial productivity measure seems quite 
straightforward, Professor Daniel Farber questions whether the 
number of published opinions measure fairly captures judicial 
productivity.14 The more serious issue, however, is whether Professors 
Choi and Gulati’s productivity measure is an effective means to 
identify qualified Supreme Court appointees, even if it is an accurate 
measure of productivity. The average circuit court judge in Choi and 
Gulati’s sample wrote over thirty-two published opinions per year.15 
Supreme Court Justices now write fewer than ten opinions per year.16 
It hardly seems relevant to prioritize circuit court productivity as a 
standard for Supreme Court appointments when even the least-
productive circuit court judges match all the Justices of the Supreme 
Court in opinion-writing frequency. Indeed, some circuit court judges 
may write fewer opinions because they devote greater time and care 
to crafting each individual opinion, a feature that should be 
considered a positive for appointment to the Supreme Court. The 
productivity measure may have uses, but it hardly seems salient for 
Supreme Court appointment evaluations. 
One might also argue that the Choi and Gulati independence 
measure is a questionable measure of judicial quality. It rewards 
separate opinion writing, which is at best a debatable measure of 
quality, since collegiality and deference to other panel members may 
be a better measure. The partisan composition of the circuit courts 
may also skew these independence calculations. For example, if 
Republican judges predominate in the circuit courts, Democratic 
judges will systematically have lower independence scores, simply 
because they have relatively less opportunity to demonstrate 
independence from other Democratic appointees on the same panel.  
 
 14. Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial Performance, 
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2005). He suggests, for example, that the decision to publish 
precedents may reflect only the “self-centeredness” of the judge. Id. A count of unpublished 
opinions might be added to this measure. 
 15. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 1, at 44. 
 16. Even if the Supreme Court were to double the number of cases it accepts, which 
Professors Choi and Gulati believe might be beneficial, its annual opinion output would still be 
much less than that of the median circuit court judge. 
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Professors Choi and Gulati apparently conceive of the 
independence measure as a test of non-ideological decisionmaking, 
which may be based on findings that appointees of the same party 
appear to influence one another and vote together.17 Yet the 
independence scale fails to measure this form of effect if there is a 
range of ideological preferences within the cohort of appointees of 
one party.18 Indeed, the measure would actually “reward” the most 
ideologically extreme of party appointees.19 Suppose that a particular 
circuit judge appointed by a Democratic president was extremely 
liberal. This judge might often dissent from the opinions of other 
Democratic appointees because their decisions were not liberal 
enough, thus revealing ideological extremity rather than any “true” 
ideological independence. 
Moreover, the vast majority of circuit court decisions are not 
ideologically driven.20 Consequently, a purely ideological judge would 
produce a very high independence score given that most of the 
decisions rendered by other appointees of the same party are far less 
ideological.21 A much simpler and more readily available test for non-
ideological decisionmaking would directly analyze the ideological 
direction of the judge’s decisions and the extent to which ideology 
appears to explain those rulings.22 Thus the independence measure 
 
 17. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168–73 
(1998) (showing the effect of the ideological composition of court panels on judicial voting); 
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1717, 1751–58 (1997) (reporting the effects of other panel members on judicial decisions). 
 18. This association is apparent from casual observation of the Supreme Court. Justices 
Stevens and Souter were appointed by Republican presidents, as were Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, but the two sets frequently disagree with one another on ideologically patterned 
grounds. There are now “judicial common space” scores that place circuit court judges on a 
continuum of ideology, based on their votes, and there are significant differences even among 
appointees from the same president. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 303, 304, 320 (2007). 
 19. See Marshall, supra note 2, at 127 (noting that the measure “rewards a judge who is 
outside the ideological mainstream”). 
 20. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 1457, 1504–09 (2003) (demonstrating that ideology explains only a small portion of circuit 
judges’ voting behavior and has lesser explanatory power than legal factors). 
 21. There is some evidence that the Choi & Gulati scores are indeed influenced by this 
effect. See WERL, supra note 2, at 177 (noting that the highest independence scores were 
associated with Reagan appointees that were the most “extreme” Republican judges on the 
circuit courts). 
 22. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility of Empirical Measurements in 
Judicial Selection, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1415, 1437–40 (2005) (suggesting that although judges 
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may capture little more than judicial disagreeability.23 In that respect, 
there appears to be a sound norm that such disagreeability at the 
circuit court level is not a praiseworthy judicial attribute.24 Even if the 
independence measure does capture non-ideological judging, it might 
be a poor test for Supreme Court appointees because as we will 
discuss in Part I.B.2, ideology plays an important role on the Court. 
The citation test has more validity, but it is also controversial. 
The reliability of citation analysis as a measure of judicial quality has 
been much ventilated in earlier research. One problem associated 
with the measure is that citations may be negative, criticizing the cited 
opinion.25 More citations may reflect longevity on the bench or some 
other feature rather than judicial quality. Citations vary in 
importance; some are centrally relied upon to reach decisions, 
whereas others are fodder for only a string cite. Citation decisions 
may be infected by judicial friendship (or animus), and they may be 
influenced by the choices of judicial clerks as much as the citing 
judges themselves.26 Indeed, clerks may have largely written the cited 
opinions for which the judges are receiving credit in the tournament.27 
 
who vote together against the desires of their appointing president should be given credit for 
independence, the measure gives them no credit). 
 23. Professors Choi and Gulati conceded that this measure might really capture 
“cantankerousness and unwillingness to compromise as opposed to real independence.” Choi & 
Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner?, supra note 1, at 38. The willingness to author a separate opinion 
might also be a reflection of judicial self-centeredness. See Farber, supra note 14, at 1177. 
 24. See James J. Brudney, Foreseeing Greatness? Measurable Performance Criteria and the 
Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1015, 1031 (2005) (“[J]udges are 
often critical of any pronounced tendency to write separate opinions. They fear the erosion of 
institutional integrity that may result . . . . [and] worry that a judicial inclination to write 
separately may reflect a somewhat arrogant unwillingness to deliberate and genuinely consider 
alternative views, an unwillingness that in turn leads to poorer work products.”). Circuit court 
judges have written on the values of collegiality. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of 
Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1640–41 (2003) 
(“[C]ollegiality mitigates judges’ ideological preferences and enables us to find common ground 
and reach better decisions.”); Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges on Judging: The “C” Word: On 
Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 585, 586 (1995) (“I nevertheless believe that there is a value in 
collegiality that affects the quality of judicial decisionmaking.”). Scholars consider collegiality a 
criteria that good judges should possess. See Gerhardt, supra note 2, at 358. 
 25. Professors Choi and Gulati take note of the possibility that some citations may be 
attributable to “outrageously” bad decisions and hence measure negative citations for a subset 
of their judges. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 1, at 55. They found that negative 
citations did not explain the high citation rates of their top judges. Id. at 56–57. 
 26. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A 
Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 272–75 (1998) 
(setting out these and other potential criticisms of citation analysis in detail). 
 27. Professors Choi and Gulati have recognized the widespread belief that circuit court 
opinions are often written by clerks. They tried to isolate those judges most likely to draft their 
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Although all these criticisms are relevant concerns, none of them 
have been documented as seriously undermining the validity of the 
citation measure, which remains commonly used. 
Underlying most of the common criticisms of citation analysis is 
the concern that an uncontrolled factor, independent of judicial 
quality, has infected the analysis. For example, a judge setting forth 
the first explication of standards on a procedural issue such as 
summary judgment may be repeatedly cited simply because the issue 
so commonly arises in litigation. Similarly, some types of cases are 
simply more common and therefore more likely to receive citations 
than other types of cases. Not all citations are “created equally”;28 
citation frequency may even be a matter of “just plain luck.”29 This 
does not invalidate the quantitative analysis of citations, however. 
Such errors are likely to be randomly distributed throughout the 
judicial population and may therefore be considered statistical 
“noise.”30 The presence of this feature tends to make it more difficult 
to find true statistical significance and consequently may add further 
confidence to results that find such significance.31 Nevertheless, the 
possibility of such random noise does caution against giving undue 
weight to any single study’s conclusion, especially if a sample size is 
relatively small.32 
Although citation analysis is plainly imperfect, like any measure, 
it offers very useful information about circuit court judges. It provides 
a more rigorous quantitative scale, in addition to the more common 
subjective evaluations that may speak more about the judgments of 
the evaluators than the quality of the judges themselves. Indeed, a 
“judge whose opinions are consistently useful to others is probably 
doing something right, whereas a judge whose opinions are rarely 
 
own opinions. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and 
Should We Care)? 3 (N.Y. Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 05-06, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=715062 (“We use generic techniques from computational 
linguistics, as well as several methods tailored for the judicial setting, to explore both the 
desirability and feasibility of determining the authorship of judicial opinions.”). 
 28. Vladeck, supra note 22, at 1432. 
 29. Farber, supra note 14, at 1178. 
 30. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 381, 390 (2000). 
 31. For some discussion of this point, see id. 
 32. The Choi and Gulati results are limited to three years of opinions. This is not a 
criticism, as the data collection efforts required for such a study are daunting. However, it 
counsels some caution in interpretation, as a larger sample might yield different results, and 
judges’ quality may change over their tenure on the bench. 
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cited is probably performing badly.”33 Indeed, circuit court judges 
have testified to the practical validity of this measure. In one survey, 
most of the judges interviewed “felt that the name on the opinion” 
cited by attorneys “did affect their decisionmaking at times.”34 
Although citation influence reflects one scale of judicial quality, akin 
to influence, as discussed below, the normative significance of this 
scale remains debatable. 
Others have taken issue with Professors Choi and Gulati’s 
exclusive focus on circuit court judges in their rating system, at the 
expense of state court judges or politicians. These critics note that the 
highest-rated Supreme Court Justices have come from other sources.35 
This is an accurate point, but it does not demean Choi and Gulati’s 
effort. Today’s Court is composed solely of former circuit court 
judges, as the circuit courts have become the most common source for 
Supreme Court nominees.36 The proposed tournament at least allows 
a screening for this category of appointees.37 
2. Broader Usage Critiques.  Critics have also focused more 
generally on the use of the Choi and Gulati methodology. These 
criticisms questioned the wisdom of their chosen methodology 
notwithstanding the accuracy of its scales. In social scientific terms, 
the critiques questioned the measures’ validity rather than their 
reliability. In this view, the variables they measured do not address 
the key concerns regarding judicial quality. Even if the measures did 
capture the concept of judicial quality at the circuit court level, those 
metrics are not necessarily relevant to the qualities that are important 
at the Supreme Court level. 
One of the most extensive critiques of Professors Choi and 
Gulati that blends methodology with usage comes from Larry Solum, 
who has produced his own “Solumonic” standards for judicial 
aptitude.38 He argues that Choi and Gulati have avoided the difficult 
 
 33. Farber, supra note 14, at 1179. 
 34. KLEIN, supra note 5, at 94. 
 35. See Steven Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1237, 1237 (2005); WERL, supra note 2, at 165–67. 
 36. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial 
Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 903, 905 (2003) (addressing the increased reliance on promotion from circuit courts). 
 37. Professors Choi and Gulati acknowledge this point and suggest the possibility of 
empirically measuring candidates from other fields as well. Choi & Gulati, A Tournament, supra 
note 1, at 319–20. 
 38. See Solum, supra note 2 (manuscript at 1–2). 
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question of identifying judicial virtues. In this regard, Professor 
Solum identifies the relatively uncontroversial “thin” judicial virtues 
as including incorruptibility, courage, temperament and impartiality, 
diligence and carefulness, intelligence, and craft.39 He also sets forth 
thick virtues of justice and practical wisdom.40 These standards 
roughly trace traditional subjective scales for judicial quality.41 
Professor Solum suggests some approaches to screen for these virtues, 
including evaluation of opinions and the judges’ involvement in 
public life.42 
Professor Solum argues that the citation measure fails to capture 
these thin and thick virtues, suggesting that citations may be driven by 
convenience and thus that citation frequency is not necessarily a good 
guide to opinion quality.43 He maintains not only that Professors Choi 
and Gulati measured the wrong factors but also that the very 
“selection of judges on the basis of measurable performance criteria 
would lead us away from true excellence.”44 Still worse, he suggests 
that the proposal’s end result would be “awful,” with judges lacking 
the “virtues of integrity, wisdom, or justice.”45 Given the results of the 
tournament, this criticism may be somewhat hyperbolic. Few would 
argue that Judge Posner is utterly lacking in these Solumonic values. 
Moreover, the citation measure seems reasonably associated with 
many of Solum’s standards, including the thin virtues of diligence, 
craft, intelligence, as well as (plausibly) the thick virtues of justice and 
practical wisdom. Unless one has a very cynical view of the process of 
citation, the measure probably captures some element of judicial 
virtue as identified by Professor Solum.46 
 
 39. Id. (manuscript at 4–8). 
 40. Id. (manuscript at 8–10). 
 41. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY 
OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II, at 1–2 (5th ed. 
2008) (suggesting eight standards including judicial temperament, knowledge of the law, and the 
ability to handle judicial power sensibly); ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE 
FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES 50–51 (1978) (suggesting standards including analytical powers, 
knowledge, courage, and character). 
 42. Solum, supra note 2 (manuscript at 11). 
 43. Id. (manuscript at 15–17) (noting that other variables, such as the ease with which that 
authority can be located, influence the probability that a given authority will be cited). 
 44. Id. (manuscript at 1). 
 45. Id. (manuscript at 22). 
 46. It is possible that this is not the case, because of the nature of opinions receiving more 
citations, which we will discuss extensively below. See infra Part III.A.1. 
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With respect to his specific arguments, Professor Solum 
maintains that the quality of judges cannot be precisely quantified by 
any measure. Yet Professors Choi and Gulati do not profess that their 
system is perfect; as Professor Solum acknowledges, they only wish to 
“do better than the status quo.”47 Although Solum claims that reliance 
on measurable criteria might worsen the system, he makes no effort 
to examine, much less defend, the status quo. nor does he offer any 
other than amorphous proposals to achieve the same objective as 
Choi and Gulati’s tournament,48 or identify any particular judges who 
rate well or poorly according to his criteria.49 Thus Solum offers 
insight into judicial virtue but does not delegitimize the tournament 
approach. Nevertheless, Professor Solum does reasonably argue that 
Choi and Gulati’s specific operationalization of judicial quality is 
arguably flawed. These arguments are considered in Part III. 
Another criticism arises from the possibility that the rating 
system might be manipulated or “gamed” by circuit court judges 
maneuvering for a promotion.50 For example, judges may readily raise 
their independence measure simply by writing concurring or 
dissenting opinions. The citation measure is not readily manipulable 
by the opinion-writing judge but certainly can be manipulated by 
friends or co-ideologues. Alternatively, presidents might manipulate 
the system by using defective quality ratings to shield otherwise 
ideological appointment to the Court.51 Professor Solum raises this 
criticism and discusses how each of the measures might be gamed.52 
Yet while such strategic behavior could undermine the measure’s 
validity, the criticism lacks the necessary comparative element 
 
 47. Solum, supra note 2 (manuscript at 2). 
 48. See id. (manuscript at 11–12). His proposals range from the insignificant (Supreme 
Court appointees should be over thirty years old), id. (manuscript at 11), to the unhelpful (they 
should be screened for the “lawfulness” of their opinions), id. (manuscript at 12). Solum 
contends that “we have good reason to believe” that we can screen for his virtues, id., but he 
offers no specifics on how to do so or how likely the government is to adopt any such specifics, 
should they be identifiable. 
 49. Absent such specification, the criteria for quality judges are not helpful. See Frank B. 
Cross, Gay Politics and Precedents, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1186, 1208 (2005) (book review) 
(observing that critics of the present system have produced only “amorphous” standards for 
judicial quality and have failed to offer examples of “quality judges,” such that their criticism 
offers little value to the confirmation process). 
 50. Marshall, supra note 2, at 122–23. 
 51. Id. at 131. 
 52. Solum, supra note 2 (manuscript at 18–20). 
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because the present system may also involve gaming one’s promotion 
prospects. Strategic networking probably infects any selection system. 
Under the status quo system, judges can game promotion by 
rendering decisions amenable to the potential appointing president. 
Professor Solum might find this type of behavior especially abhorrent 
because of its potential to compromise justice and the rule of law for 
selfish advantage. Empirical evidence does exist to suggest that such 
strategic behavior has occurred in district court decisions on the 
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The findings 
of an extensive study of Guideline rulings found that the promotion 
potential of district court judges was a statistically significant 
determinant of case outcomes.53 
Perhaps the most trenchant usage critique for the Choi and 
Gulati measures focuses on the special role played by the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court’s unique role in the American political 
system undermines any attempt to extrapolate circuit court 
performance as a measure of the quality of a Supreme Court Justice.54 
Professors Choi and Gulati recognize that “[t]he best soldiers are not 
always the best leaders.”55 The shortcoming of their methodology for 
selecting leaders is most obvious with the productivity test, as 
discussed in Part I.B.1, but this shortcoming also affects their other 
standards to some degree as well. 
The goal of judicial evaluation research may be to develop some 
objective test for Supreme Court appointments. Professors Choi and 
Gulati specifically comment that their effort was borne of “frustration 
with the current appointment process.”56 There is indeed a 
widespread belief that the Court’s appointment system is somehow 
 
 53. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the 
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1488–93 
(1998). Similar results were found by Mark A. Cohen. See Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial 
Behavior or What’s “Unconstitutional” About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 183, 198 (1991). Judges seeking promotion “have to toe the popular line or at least a line 
acceptable to the Senate Judiciary Committee.” Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial 
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 545 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
 54. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 22, at 1417 (“[T]he talents one needs to be a superior 
Supreme Court Justice are light years apart from those needed to stand out on the court of 
appeals, and thus even a stellar performance on the court of appeals is no predictor of success 
on the high court.”); see also Goldberg, supra note 35, at 1242–43 (drawing the analogy between 
success in college football and failure at the professional level). James Brudney uses a 
comparison of Burger and Blackmun’s records on the circuit court and Supreme Court to make 
this same point. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 1029–38. 
 55. Choi & Gulati, A Tournament, supra note 1, at 310. 
 56. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 1, at 26. 
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broken and needs to be “fixed.”57 This belief is not uncommon, as 
commentators have suggested that the confirmation process produces 
only mediocre judges58 and is best described as a “mess.”59 Others 
more modestly suggest that the confirmation process precludes the 
selection of “great” Justices and is biased in favor of “competent, 
noncontroversial jurists with a restrained understanding of the role of 
the federal judiciary.”60 Prominent among the criticisms is that the 
selection process focuses unduly on judicial ideology.61 
The ideological focus in appointments is not necessarily 
misplaced, however; it may be appropriate and inevitable,62 as argued 
by Terri Jennings Peretti.63 She notes that presidents have generally 
appointed judges based on ideological compatibility and that 
senatorial confirmation has likewise been ideologically grounded.64 
This ideological influence is normatively appropriate, she believes, 
 
 57. See Cross, supra note 49, at 1206–09 (reviewing the criticisms of the current nomination 
process). 
 58. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, A Court of Mediocrity, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 74, 74 (stating that 
since Benjamin Cardozo, “subsequent Supreme Court nominees and appointees have been 
invariably pedestrian”). 
 59. See STEPHEN CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS passim (1994); Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, Revisited, 84 
NW. U. L. REV. 962 passim (1990). Other descriptions use words like “mess, abysmal, broken, 
going in the wrong direction, and downright disorderly, contentious, and unpredictable.” Lee 
Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2005) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 60. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT 
CONFIRMATIONS 175 (updated college ed. 1994). 
 61. See Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 1, at 26 (“The genesis of this project 
lies in our frustration with the current appointment process. As best as we can tell, the entire 
focus in analyzing a candidate’s qualifications is on predicting their expected votes on a handful 
of issues.”). 
 62. Professors Choi and Gulati acknowledge this point to some degree, and argue that their 
measures are simply a tool to make politicians openly acknowledge ideological influence. Id. at 
27–28. Given the nature of the process, though, this hardly seems necessary. It is an open secret 
that ideology largely determines Supreme Court appointments. Choi and Gulati go on to refer 
to it as an “informal norm,” id. at 37, and, in another work, they concede that “it is well 
recognized that politics in fact does play a large (and constitutional) role in both the nomination 
and confirmation of federal judges,” Choi & Gulati, A Tournament, supra note 1, at 301 n.5. It 
seems unlikely that either voters or senators seriously credit presidential claims that 
appointments are based on quality. See Brannon P. Denning, Empirical Measures of Judicial 
Performance: Thoughts on Choi and Gulati’s Tournament of Judges, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1123, 1132 (2005) (“[P]erhaps [Choi and Gulati] simply overestimate the degree to which voters 
and Senators credit presidential claims of merit.”). 
 63. TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999). 
 64. Id. at 85–89. 
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because it yields a politically representative Court, albeit with some 
time lag.65 Insofar as Justices reach decisions of political salience when 
the underlying law is indeterminate, such a connection is a defensible 
one. Thus, Professor Peretti contends that policy-motivated judges 
further the basic goals of democracy in a way that apolitical judges 
cannot. 
The Supreme Court by its nature makes some discretionary, 
ideological judgments that are not resolved by technical legal 
acumen.66 For example, giving content to the meaning of “due 
process” requires discretionary judgment. Although Solumonic 
“practical wisdom” is relevant to this discretionary judgment, there 
are nonetheless ideological elements central to the meaning. Ample 
empirical research demonstrates that ideological decisionmaking is 
commonplace at the Court.67 Given this finding, it appears that 
“[l]egal quality matters least on supreme courts.”68 To the extent that 
ideological judgments are an important part of a Justices’ role, it is 
more sensible that political ideology influences their selection. Of 
course, an utterly ideological process, without any regard for judicial 
aptitude of the Solumonic sort, would be undesirable. But there is no 
evidence that such an unfortunate situation prevails.69 
Lee Epstein, Jeff Segal, Nancy Staudt, and Rene Lindstadt 
conducted a study in which they considered the perceived 
qualifications of the appointees, as well as their ideologies.70 They find 
that relative qualifications are a statistically significant factor in 
 
 65. Id. at 100–01. 
 66. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A 
DEMOCRACY 174 (1977) (observing that such legal acumen is “not a sufficient condition . . . for 
dealing competently with questions of constitutional law” when political judgment is inevitable); 
Brudney, supra note 24, at 1044 (contending that the “real world seeks considerable value” in 
the interplay of law and politics in the Supreme Court). 
 67. For a review of this evidence, see PERETTI, supra note 63, at 102–11. The classic work 
of empirical research on this question is JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). Their findings have been confirmed 
by considerable subsequent research. A meta-analysis of the empirical research shows 
consistent ideological associations in decisionmaking, which are particularly pronounced at the 
Supreme Court level. Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: 
A Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999). 
 68. Cross, supra note 49, at 1211. This claim does not depend on the Justices being 
particularly willful and law-disregarding; it is a feature of the Court taking the sorts of close 
cases for which traditional legal materials cannot answer the questions presented. See id. 
 69. See id. (noting that the evidence shows that judges compromise their ideological 
preferences when the law is plainly to the contrary). 
 70. Epstein et al., supra note 59, at 1160 fig.3, 1162 fig.4. 
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Senate votes for nominees, both by themselves and when linked with 
ideological concerns.71 Moreover, they find that a very highly 
qualified nominee is virtually assured of confirmation, regardless of 
ideological concerns.72 This aspect of the process might be improved, 
though, by the proposed tournament if it effectively captured 
qualifications more precisely than contemporary conventional 
subjective measures. 
Contrary to claims sometimes made, it is unclear that the 
assertedly growing importance of judicial ideology in the appointment 
process has reduced the quality of Supreme Court Justices in recent 
years. Michael Comiskey has analyzed the estimated quality of 
Supreme Court Justices over the years, through a broad survey of 
professors of law and political science.73 He found that the average 
quality of selections since 1967 was actually higher than that of earlier 
selections.74 Although his measures were purely subjective, there is no 
empirical evidence whatsoever demonstrating that recent 
appointments were of lower quality. 
It may be that there is no methodology that can precisely predict 
the future quality of a Supreme Court Justice.75 This does not 
undermine the effort to identify such a disciplined methodology of 
quality, though. One cannot know until one tries, and the effort may 
provide some useful information on judicial quality. Moreover, the 
rating of circuit judges has a variety of benefits, unrelated to Supreme 
Court appointment, which are addressed below. 
 
 71. Id. at 1171. The results of the study show that ideological agreement is significant, that 
qualifications are significant, and that qualifications are even more significant when the 
appointee is ideologically more distant from the voting senator. Id. at 1171–72. 
 72. See id. at 1170; see also KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT 38–40 (2002) (reviewing recent nominations and finding that great importance was 
placed on a nominee’s qualifications). 
 73. MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME COURT 
NOMINEES 18 (2004). 
 74. Id. at 86–87. Comiskey’s results provided some support for the suggestion that modern 
confirmation prevents the appointment of “great” Justices because none of the modern Justices 
were categorized as great. See id. at 98–99 (observing that Antonin Scalia, the highest-rated 
appointee since 1967, received a rating significantly below the “greatness” cutoff). This may 
simply reflect a reluctance of the evaluators to ascribe greatness to their contemporaries, whose 
decisions have not yet stood the test of time. See Cross, supra note 49, at 1210 (“[P]erceptions of 
greatness appear only after time.”). Moreover, this effect is more than counterbalanced by the 
apparent ability of the current process to screen out unusually bad Justices, evidenced by the 
higher mean evaluation of quality. 
 75. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Art of Judicial Biography, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1595, 1641–45 
(1995) (book review) (arguing that it is virtually impossible to predict the greatness of a Justice 
in advance). 
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The research on the prevailing selection and confirmation 
methods does not demonstrate the optimality of the selection process, 
and one might argue that quality measures have at least some value in 
choosing the best-quality judges within a given ideological group. This 
point has some validity, but it means that a more refined test for 
quality is necessary. Such a test requires an understanding of the 
different types of judging and the meaning of judicial quality, as well 
as the ability to capture that meaning. This is a daunting task. Before 
turning to this analysis, we review other published research on the 
evaluation of judges. 
C. Other Research Assessing Judges 
Several other empirical studies have sought to measure the 
quality of judges empirically, and they are reviewed in this Section. 
Like Professors Choi and Gulati’s study, most of these studies have 
focused on the circuit court judiciary, and they have commonly used 
some measure of citation frequency as their test for quality. Research 
in this field generally traces to a 1976 article by Professors William 
Landes and Richard Posner, setting out an economic model of 
precedent.76 Landes and Posner theorized that the importance of a 
precedent is represented by the number of times that it is cited. The 
main finding of the article was that the influence of precedents 
depreciated over time, as expected. Posner has built on this article to 
further analyze the value of citation analysis in various contexts.77 
Professors Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael Solimine 
conducted an elaborate citation analysis of circuit court judges to 
measure “judicial influence.”78 They measured outside circuit citations 
for judges sitting on the circuit courts from 1992 to 1995. On their 
scale of influence, Judge Posner was first and Judge Easterbrook 
third, with Judge Selya of the First Circuit coming in second.79 Judge 
Selya jumped to the top of the list for total citations.80 Using different 
data, their results essentially conform to the findings of Choi and 
Gulati. 
 
 76. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 271 (1976). 
 77. Posner, supra note 30 passim. 
 78. Landes et al., supra note 26, at 276–79. 
 79. Id. at 288. 
 80. Id. at 298. 
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Professors David Klein and Darby Morrisroe conducted a major 
study on the prestige and influence of circuit court judges, using 
published opinions between 1987 and 1990, 81 roughly parallel to the 
years covered by Professors Choi and Gulati. Their basic standard 
was the explicit invocation of particular judges by name in others’ 
opinions.82 This represents a possible—but not definitive—direct 
measure of the respect accorded to judges by their fellow judges.83 
Most of the circuit court judges studied were not explicitly invoked by 
name, but others were named more frequently. The results of this 
study generally correspond to those of Choi and Gulati’s study: 
Judges Posner and Easterbrook were third and fourth in their 
prestige score (the first-ranked judge might be ascribed to his 
Sentencing Commission service rather than opinions, whereas the 
judge ranked second, Stephen Breyer, was appointed to the Supreme 
Court in the interim).84 Klein and Morrisroe also conducted a 
sensitivity test and found that their results were significantly 
associated with other measures such as citations and quality 
evaluations by practicing attorneys, but not with ABA ratings.85 
These prestige rankings received some validity confirmation in 
subsequent empirical research. Professor Klein went on to identify 
cases announcing new legal rules in the areas of antitrust, search and 
seizure, and environmental law that were decided during the 1980s 
and 1990s.86 He then tested to see if subsequent circuit decisions 
adopted that rule and sought to determine the factors that predicted 
such an adoption. His judicial prestige measure, along with other 
factors, was a statistically significant determinant of subsequent 
adoptions.87 Thus, invocations appear to be a meaningful measure of 
prestige that influences the subsequent course of the law. 
A more recent analysis by Professors Jeffrey Berger and Tracey 
George has compared circuit court judges on a test of “judicial 
 
 81. David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 379 (1999). 
 82. Id. at 376. This invocation measure was used because such a citation is unnecessary to 
the citing opinion, except insofar as the naming of a judge lends some persuasive import to the 
cited decision. Id. at 375–76. 
 83. Id. at 376. 
 84. Id. at 381. 
 85. Id. at 384–85. 
 86. KLEIN, supra note 5, at 40–41. 
 87. Id. at 78–79. Other significant determinants included the relative ideology of the judges 
and whether the decision was from the same circuit, confirming both the political and the legal 
model of judicial decisionmaking. Id. at 79. 
CROSS & LINDQUIST IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:04:41 PM 
1402 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1383 
entrepreneurship.”88 This study examined Supreme Court citations to 
circuit court decisions in the 1994 to 2002 terms.89 As in much of the 
quantitative research, Judges Easterbrook and Posner were the most-
cited circuit court judges.90 In general, the research on citations 
produces consistent results even over time and with different 
measures, at least at the top of the list of most-cited judges. This adds 
some credibility to the conclusions drawn about the “best” circuit 
court judges by this measure. The conclusions of the research appear 
quite robust. Choi and Gulati have observed that Judge Posner “is 
cited more by his colleagues on the Seventh Circuit, by other circuit 
judges, by law professors, and by the Supreme Court” than any other 
judge, and typically by a substantial amount.91 
The existing research is largely internally consistent and 
supportive of Professors Choi and Gulati’s conclusions, which may be 
unsurprising given the general similarity of measuring tools it has 
used. Having reviewed this research on circuit court judges, we turn 
to our own elaboration of the analysis. In Part II, we add an 
important set of new data that measures the fate of the judges’ 
opinions in the Supreme Court. Once this is done, we can reevaluate 
the existing measures of judicial quality. 
II.  EVIDENCE FROM SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
Commentators have occasionally suggested that circuit court 
judges might be evaluated based on the frequency with which the 
Supreme Court reversed their decisions. To date, however, this 
measure has not actually been implemented. This Part provides such 
data to implement this test of circuit court judges based on Supreme 
Court review. Although the success of judges’ opinions before the 
Supreme Court should not be considered the exclusive measure of 
circuit court judge quality, it is a legitimate factor to be considered. 
 
 88. Jeffrey A. Berger & Tracey E. George, Judicial Entrepreneurs on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals: A Citation Analysis of Judicial Influence 2–3 (Vanderbilt U. Law Sch. Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 05-24, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789544. 
 89. Id. (manuscript at 3). 
 90. Id. (manuscript at 15). 
 91. Choi & Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner?, supra note 1, at 28–29. The Posner effect may be 
biased by his extensive outside writings as a public intellectual. 
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A. Significance of Supreme Court Review 
The relative success of circuit court judges’ decisions on Supreme 
Court review might seem like an obvious standard for their 
evaluation. On the other hand, a critic of this standard might suggest 
that the decision reversing the circuit court judge could also be 
erroneous and that the best circuit court judges are more likely to 
“get it right” than the Supreme Court on review of their rulings.92 Yet 
this criticism inevitably undermines every attempt to measure judicial 
quality and thus is not dispositive. There is no objective external test 
for the “legal correctness” of a decision or the “legal quality” of an 
opinion available to researchers.93 Thus, while imperfect, reversal by 
the Supreme Court remains one reasonable approach to evaluating 
judicial quality. 
Indeed, the Choi and Gulati measures and other citation tests 
analogously rely on a presumption that later citing judges reliably 
reflect quality assessment. A similar presumption for the high Court 
is equally fair and perhaps preferable because the Court’s decisions 
are the law of the land. The Supreme Court hears many fewer cases 
and consequently has the advantage of having considerably more 
time to evaluate the legal issues. The Court often has far better legal 
and other information on which to ground its decisions.94 Moreover, 
circuit courts may be regarded as agents of the Supreme Court,95 so it 
seems appropriate to consider the evaluations of their principal.96 
Finally, Professors Landes, Lessig, and Solimine claim that the 
 
 92. See Vladeck, supra note 22, at 1435 (expressing doubt that “the Supreme Court always 
has the better argument”). 
 93. See Cross, supra note 20, at 1499–500 (discussing the “difficulty in independently 
verifying the correctness of a decision”). 
 94. Supreme Court cases receive far more information from amici than those at the circuit 
court level. Similarly, the litigants themselves typically devote more time and resources to 
briefing cases at the Supreme Court level. The Court also has the benefit of more support from 
clerks and the opportunity to choose the very best clerks from the circuit court level, after they 
have proved their adeptness in a prior circuit court clerkship. 
 95. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of 
Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 673, 673 (1994) (addressing the principal-agent relationship between the courts). 
 96. Brannon Denning seemingly disputes this and argues that “[a]n appeals court could 
make a good-faith effort to apply Court precedent, only to have the Court adopt an equally 
plausible interpretation of its own precedent or repudiate its prior decisions and proceed in an 
entirely new direction.” Denning, supra note 62, at 1141. This is a potential shortcoming of the 
measure, but he offers no argument for how frequently this occurs, and its occurrence would 
again fall within the category of statistical noise, discussed above, which affects all conceivable 
quantitative metrics of evaluation. 
CROSS & LINDQUIST IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:04:41 PM 
1404 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1383 
Supreme Court “rarely takes cases” from top-ranked judges because 
those judges tend to “get things ‘right,’”97 though this claim is still an 
open question. 
Another more trenchant critique of the Supreme Court review 
standard lies in the Court’s ideological decisionmaking. It is beyond 
dispute that the Justices are influenced by their political ideologies in 
ruling on the cases that they choose to hear.98 Consequently, the 
Court’s frequent reversal of a particular judge’s decisions might 
reflect nothing more than ideological incompatibility between the 
Court’s majority and the judge or opinion under review.99 If so, 
reversals would reflect little about the actual legal quality of the 
circuit court judge’s opinions. Indeed, the association may be contrary 
to the correct measure of legal quality to the extent it is driven by 
ideology rather than legal norms or principles. One author suggests 
that the reversal rate for the Ninth Circuit was high because that 
court was “too law-abiding” under existing precedents at a time when 
the Rehnquist Court was devoted to changing the existing law.100 Yet 
rigorous empirical analyses have demonstrated that the Court is 
influenced by legal norms as well as ideological considerations.101 The 
circuit courts annually render hundreds or even thousands of opinions 
that are ideologically contrary to the justices’ preferences. Most of 
these decisions are not reversed, suggesting that there remains some 
additional significance to a reversal beyond mere ideological 
incompatibility. Further, we can empirically examine the degree to 
which the ideological bias taints our results. 
One can imagine other criticisms of the Supreme Court review 
standard. Circuit judges are individuals responsible for hundreds of 
 
 97. Landes et al., supra note 26, at 325–26. 
 98. See supra note 67. 
 99. See Choi & Gulati, A Tournament, supra note 1, at 307 (noting that this measure “may 
unfairly penalize judges with different political views from those on the Court”); Posner, supra 
note 4, at 1273 (“[M]any reversals by the Supreme Court reflect ideological differences . . . .”). 
 100. Michele Landis Dauber, The 9th Circuit Follows, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19, 2002, at 36. 
This conclusion might be challenged, though, given the persistence of the circuit’s high reversal 
rate even after the Rehnquist Court had worked to change the law. In addition, the Ninth 
Circuit had an unusually high rate of unanimous reversals, joined by liberal Justices, which 
suggests that this is not the true explanation. See Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: 
The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 435–36 (1998). 
 101. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential 
Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 135, 148 (2006) (finding that, independent of ideology, the Court is more likely to follow 
the reasoning process adopted by the majority of circuits and more likely to adopt the position 
of more prestigious circuit court judges). 
CROSS & LINDQUIST IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:04:41 PM 
2009] JUDGING THE JUDGES 1405 
opinions per year, and the Court reviews a small percentage of these 
rulings. Many incorrect circuit court rulings may go unexamined by 
the Supreme Court, which is not a court of “error correction.”102 
Reversal may therefore not capture the presence of a legal error 
below. A Supreme Court reversal of a given case may simply be due 
to “serendipity.”103 One answer to this critique is that the Supreme 
Court selectively reviews the most important decisions rendered by 
circuit courts, making it reasonable to use these important decisions 
as a metric.104 Moreover, to the degree that evaluation of circuit court 
judges is employed as a standard for Supreme Court appointments, it 
seems appropriate to consider the fate of their decisions at the 
Supreme Court level. 
Another possible bias of reversal measures relates to Professors 
Choi and Gulati’s productivity measure for the number of opinions 
written. Circuit court judges who write more opinions have a 
correspondingly greater likelihood of Court reversal, but they also 
have proportionally more opportunities for Court affirmances. 
Including credit for affirmances helps to moderate this criticism of a 
reversal measure. We do not suggest that the Supreme Court review 
measure is the sole test for circuit court judicial quality or even a 
“gold standard” measure. We contend only that it is an important 
metric that has not been previously considered and that may yield 
insight into the quality of circuit court judges. In this regard, we note 
that Judge Posner has suggested that a judge’s “reversal rate” serves 
as a proxy for performance.105 Moreover, as Sections B and C will 
show, the Supreme Court review standard substantially informs the 
meaning of the existing measures of circuit court judicial quality, 
including the Choi and Gulati measures. Thus it is valuable as a 
supplementary measure. 
 
 102. E.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
1047 n.257 (2005) (observing that “error correction is not a sufficient basis” for the Court to 
take a case); Kermit Roosevelt III, Essay, Light from Dead Stars: The Procedural Adequate and 
Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888, 1916 (2003) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court does not ordinarily engage in error-correction.”). 
 103. Vladeck, supra note 22, at 1435. However, this is another factor that amounts only to 
statistical noise and is refuted somewhat by the nature of the results in Part II.C, which suggest a 
systematic effect. 
 104. This conclusion might be contested. Because the Court takes the most difficult cases, it 
may not screen for the most blatant legal errors in easier cases. The latter may be left to 
correction by lower courts. 
 105. Posner, supra note 4, at 1259. 
CROSS & LINDQUIST IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:04:41 PM 
1406 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1383 
B. Data and Methods 
We gathered data on Supreme Court reversals from Supreme 
Court opinions published between 1989 to 2000. Although these data 
are not perfectly contemporaneous with data from the Choi and 
Gulati study, the Klein and Morrisroe study, and other sources, this 
limitation is by no means fatal—the underlying premise of any search 
for the “best” judge is that judicial quality of individuals is relatively 
invariant across time. If individuals’ judicial quality varies 
significantly over time, it renders it impossible to presume that the 
best contemporary judges will also be the best judges in future years. 
Some evidence does exist to suggest that judicial quality is consistent 
over time, given the relatively consistent ratings of Judges Posner and 
Easterbrook in the research described in Part I.C, which covered 
multiple years. 
For each of the Supreme Court opinions, we coded the identity 
of the circuit court judge whose opinion was being reviewed by the 
Court, excluding en banc decisions. This identified the author of the 
opinion being reviewed, the judges who signed on to the opinion, and 
any judges who dissented from the opinion. The judges were broken 
down into six categories: 
1. Authored opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court 
2. Joined opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court 
3. Dissented from opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court 
4. Authored opinion reversed by the Supreme Court 
5. Joined opinion reversed by the Supreme Court 
6. Dissented from opinion reversed by the Supreme Court 
This approach enables more elaborate testing of the fate of 
circuit court decisions than an exclusive reliance on reversals. From 
these different scales, we can assess the success of individual circuit 
court judges on Supreme Court review. 
C. Results 
This Section sets out the quantitative results of our analysis of 
the opinions of circuit court judges on Supreme Court review. We 
provide data for individual judges who were most often reversed and 
most often affirmed and who most often dissented from decisions 
reviewed by the Court. We also provide a composite measure to 
capture the totality of these effects. Finally, we also examine the 
association between these Supreme Court review metrics and 
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preexisting circuit judge ratings, such as the Choi and Gulati quality 
scale. 
We began the analysis by identifying the circuit court judges who 
were most frequently reversed by the Supreme Court during the time 
period covered in our data. The mean frequency for judge reversals 
was 2.04. Table 1 reports the five judges most frequently reversed. 
Table 1.  Most Frequently Reversed 
Reinhardt (9th) 14 
Pregerson (9th) 9 
Fletcher (9th)  8 
Chapman (4th) 7 
J. Gibson (8th) 7 
Unsurprisingly, judges on the Ninth Circuit predominate the list. 
It is widely known that the Supreme Court has reversed many 
decisions from this circuit.106 The reason for this is unclear; it may 
reflect an ideological effect, a possibility that is examined below. 
None of the very best Choi and Gulati judges were among those most 
frequently reversed by the Court. 
Next we considered the frequency of reversal for the highest 
scoring judges on the Choi and Gulati quality scale. Table 2 reports 
the number of Supreme Court reversals for the top scorers on this 
quality scale.107 Judge Lynch is not included in this list because she 
joined the circuit court midway through the Supreme Court review 
period that we considered. 
Table 2.  Choi and Gulati Winners and Reversal 
Posner (7th) 4 
Easterbrook (7th) 5 
Selya (1st) 5 
The Choi and Gulati tournament winners all suffered a 
significant number of reversals. Although they were not among the 
most reversed judges, they did each experience a reversal frequency 
 
 106. See, e.g., Jerome Farris, Judges on Judging: The Ninth Circuit—Most Maligned Circuit 
in the Country—Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465, 1465 (1997) (noting the high reversal 
rate for Ninth Circuit opinions reviewed by the Supreme Court). 
 107. These are among the top five judges as measured by Professor Choi and Gulati’s 
quality measure of number of outside citations. See Choi & Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner?, supra 
note 1, at 28. 
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about twice that of the median circuit court judge. Of course, this 
result could stem from these judges’ propensity for legal 
entrepreneurship or innovation. 
Judicial quality might also be measured by the number of a 
judge’s decisions affirmed by the Supreme Court. Because these 
affirmances generally involved particularly salient or controversial 
cases in which the circuits were split, they could provide a good 
measure of a judge’s ability to reach the “right” decision in the sorts 
of cases that are heard by the Supreme Court. The mean affirmance 
frequency was 1.26 for the period analyzed. Table 3 reports the 
frequency of affirmances for the most-affirmed circuit court judges. 
Table 3.  Most Frequently Affirmed 
Posner (7th) 8 
Higginbotham (5th) 8 
Sloviter (3d) 6 
Widener (4th) 6 
Winter (2d) 5 
Seymour (10th)  5 
Bowman (8th)  5 
The next table takes the Choi and Gulati top scorers and 
considers the number of their opinions that were affirmed by the 
Supreme Court. 
Table 4.  Choi and Gulati Winners and Affirmance 
Posner (7th)  8 
Easterbrook (7th) 4 
Selya (1st)  0 
Judge Posner is at the top of the list of affirmances, which 
supports the suggestion that he is the top circuit court judge. Judge 
Easterbrook is also relatively high on the list, well above the median 
judge, but Judge Selya had no opinions affirmed during our time 
period. These results for Supreme Court affirmances are somewhat 
consistent with the Choi and Gulati findings. 
Although these affirmance lists provide valuable information, 
they also have limitations. A circuit judge can only be affirmed when 
authoring a majority opinion. Consequently judges who are 
ideologically out of step with most of their circuits might be 
undercounted on affirmances, because they would be unable to 
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command majorities. For example, a conservative judge on a 
predominantly liberal circuit might find it difficult to write opinions 
affirmed by the Supreme Court, because such a judge would find it 
more difficult to command a majority on the panel. This effect may be 
operating for a conservative judge on the Ninth Circuit, for example. 
This flaw is corrected somewhat by the analysis of dissenting opinions 
we undertake immediately below.  
Perhaps the best single measure of judicial quality is found in 
dissents. A judge who dissented from a circuit court opinion reversed 
by the Supreme Court “got it right,” even when the panel majority 
“got it wrong.” Unfortunately, this measure is compromised by the 
relative infrequency of dissents from circuit court panels,108 and thus 
the sample of these cases is smaller. 
Table 5.  Most Frequent Dissenters from Reversed Opinions 
Kozinski (9th)  6 
Wallace (9th)  6 
Rymer (9th)  4 
Kleinfeld (9th) 4 
As hypothesized, this scale is dominated by Ninth Circuit judges, who 
had a particularly large number of reversed cases from which they 
had the opportunity to dissent. The scale is led by the more 
conservative judges on the circuit. From the Choi and Gulati list, 
Judge Posner dissented from one reversed opinion, and Judge 
Easterbrook dissented from two reversed opinions. Both Posner and 
Easterbrook also dissented from one opinion that was subsequently 
affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
To obtain an overall measure of success before the Supreme 
Court requires the combination of these results. We created a 
composite variable to reflect the cumulative success of judges before 
the Supreme Court, labeled Reviewscore. The weighting of this 
variable is somewhat arbitrary, but we gave greater weight to opinion 
authors and dissenters (both positive and negative) than to those who 
simply joined an opinion that was reviewed.109 Because the Supreme 
 
 108. For a review of the practice of dissenting on circuit courts, see generally VIRGINIA A. 
HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL 
COURT (2006). The overall probability of a dissenting opinion on the circuit courts is about 4 
percent. Id. at 66 tbl.2. 
 109. Reviewscore is based on the following weights: 
1. Authored opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court = 2 
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Court tends to reverse more decisions than it affirms, the average 
score was a negative one. The mean Reviewscore for the judges was  
-2.18. Table 6 reports the top five scores of circuit court judges on this 
metric. 
Table 6.  Top Judges on Reviewscore 
Mansmann (3d) 9
Rosenn (3d)  8
Kozinski (9th)  8
Wallace (9th)  7
Buckley (D.C.) 7
These results provide a cumulative measure of the success of circuit 
judge decisions before the Supreme Court, considering authored 
opinions, joined opinions, and dissents as compared with results at the 
Court. Although our weighting process might be modified, changes 
are unlikely to produce dramatic results in the relative standing of the 
judges. Table 7 reports the results of the top judges on the Choi and 
Gulati measure with our more comprehensive Reviewscore variable. 
Table 7.  Choi and Gulati Winners and Reviewscore 
Posner (7th)  6 
Easterbrook (7th) 1 
Selya (1st)  -10 
With his higher number of affirmances, Judge Posner does much 
better than the median judge and is near the circuit court judges with 
the top Reviewscores, tied for sixth. Judge Easterbrook is only slightly 
better than the median judge, and nowhere near the top judges on 
this scale. On the Supreme Court review measure, Judge Selya does 
poorly, with a score that is well below the median. 
 Our Supreme Court review measure is not wildly contrary to 
Professors Choi and Gulati’s findings, but neither does it confirm 
them. Their top judge, Posner, does well on the Supreme Court 
 
2. Joined opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court = 1 
3. Dissented from opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court = -2 
4. Authored opinion reversed by the Supreme Court = -2 
5. Joined opinion reversed by the Supreme Court = -1 
6. Dissented from opinion reversed by the Supreme Court = 2 
This system gave particular credit to judges whose opinions were affirmed by the Supreme 
Court or those who dissented from circuit court opinions later reversed by the Supreme Court. 
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review measure, but he is not at the very top of the measure. Their 
clear second judge, Easterbrook, does only modestly well on the 
Supreme Court measure. Another top-scoring judge in the 
preexisting research, Selya, actually does quite poorly on our 
measure. 
 Because the use of Supreme Court review has been criticized for 
potential ideological biasing of quality, we tested the data for the 
possibility of ideological skewing of the review score ratings. To do 
so, we first assigned a point estimate of ideology for each circuit court 
judge, computed by Professors Michael Giles, Virginia Hettinger, and 
Todd Peppers.110 On this scale, higher scores are associated with 
higher measures of a judge’s conservatism. These scores were tested 
as a determinant of our cumulative Reviewscore variable. The results 
are graphically depicted in the following figure. 
 
 110. See Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: 
A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 624 (2001). The 
estimates for individual judges were based on presidential ideology plus consideration of 
senatorial ideology when senatorial courtesy was relevant to the appointment. Id. at 626–27. 
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Figure 1.  Ideology and Reviewscore 
 
The regression line is slightly ascending, which indicates that 
conservative circuit judges tend to have slightly higher Reviewscores 
than liberal judges, but the association does not approach statistical 
significance. Moreover, the R2 term was less than .02, which 
demonstrates that any association was a very slight one that would 
not materially bias the use of this measure in evaluation. There was 
some “Ninth Circuit effect” in our results. But there is no obvious 
reason why the Supreme Court would have a vendetta against this 
circuit, so the results presumably display the Court’s evaluation of the 
correctness of that circuit’s decisions. By contrast, Professors Choi 
and Gulati’s citation analysis apparently does contain a substantial 
ideological bias.111 Hence, this potential bias counsels in favor of 
 
 111. See WERL, supra note 2, at 174 (reporting a statistically significant association between 
appointment by a Republican president and higher citation counts). 
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considering Supreme Court review in the evaluation of circuit court 
judges. 
 Although we have compared Professor Choi and Gulati’s top 
scorers with the results of Supreme Court review, a more rigorous 
statistical analysis is necessary to assess the association of their scores 
with Supreme Court results. Consequently, we now undertake 
regressions comparing the scores from Choi and Gulati’s citation 
count measure, which they described as their measure of judicial 
quality. Table 8 reports the results of simple regressions using this 
measure of quality as an independent variable, and using 
Reviewscore, reversals, and affirmances as the dependent variables. 
The t-score for each association is in parentheses after its coefficient. 
Table 8.  Choi and Gulati Quality and Supreme Court Success 
 Reviewscore Reversed Affirmed 
C&G Quality -.0003 .001 .002 
R2 0.00 0.02 0.11 
N 58 58 58 
Higher quality on Choi and Gulati’s outside circuit citations actually 
corresponds with a higher rate of reversal and a lower Reviewscore, 
though neither association is statistically significant. A higher quality 
score also translates into a higher rate of affirmance by the Supreme 
Court, and only this association is statistically significant. The quality 
judges on the Choi and Gulati measure appear to be fairly aggressive 
in their decisionmaking, provoking more frequent Supreme Court 
review. They are relatively successful in achieving higher numbers of 
affirmances, but they also suffer more losses than the average judge. 
 To explore the association between measures of judicial quality, 
we expand our analysis to consider other research. We can produce 
the correlations between various measures, and we employ the 
Reviewscore from our data; the quality score from the Choi and 
Gulati study; the prestige score from the Klein and Morrisroe study;112 
the ratings of judges summarized in the Almanac of the Judiciary, 
also from the Klein and Morrisroe study; and the judges’ Supreme 
Court citation rate (SCcite), from the Berger and George study.113 
Table 9 presents an intercorrelation matrix showing the degree to 
which each of these measures correlates with each other measure. 
 
 112. Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 81, at 375–76. 
 113. Berger & George, supra note 88 (manuscript at 3). 
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Table 9.  Intercorrelation of Judge Scores 
 Reviewscore Quality Prestige Almanac SCcite 
Reviewscore -     
Quality .0907 -    
Prestige .3136 .8950 -   
Almanac .5980 .2168 .3460 -  
SCcite .1090 .8874 .8351 .2454 - 
The clearest finding is that quality, prestige, and SCcite are highly 
correlated, which strongly suggests that they are capturing some 
underlying measure of judging. The relative lack of association with 
Reviewscore and the Almanac rating, though, suggests that these 
measures may capture only one dimension of judicial quality. 
Interestingly, the ratings of judges by lawyers in the Almanac 
correlate more closely with Reviewscore than with any of the other 
variables. Perhaps lawyers and the Supreme Court are seeing judicial 
qualities that are not measured by the circuit court citation and 
invocation scales. 
 We are hesitant to ascribe too much significance to our Supreme 
Court review results. We do not claim that they are a pure measure of 
judicial quality or that they are ambiguously superior to other 
metrics. Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit had the worst 
Reviewscore of any judge in our data, at -44. Whatever one thinks of 
his opinions, we suspect that few would regard him as clearly the 
worst circuit court judge sitting on the bench. His outside circuit 
citations in the Choi and Gulati study exceeded the median. Instead, 
we offer these Supreme Court–based scores as one additional 
dimension of quality to be considered in the evaluation. The relative 
scores of the judges are surely explained in part by the different 
approaches to judging discussed in Part III. 
III.  JUDICIAL TYPES COMPARED AND CONTRASTED 
 The use of a single quality scale or even multiple scales 
combined together implicitly presumes that there is one measure of 
judicial quality that need only be identified and quantified. It is 
possible, however, that there are multiple types of judges with 
multiple types of virtues and shortcomings, with no one type clearly 
preferable to others. In this Part, we consider the possible typologies 
of circuit court judges and how they may be seen in the quantitative 
empirical measures used to evaluate the judges. 
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 Professor Solum discussed the many features that factor into 
assessments of judicial quality, but these features can be very difficult 
to capture empirically. Professors Choi and Gulati concede that their 
empirical results miss important considerations, “such as a judge’s 
propensity to be fair, do justice, exercise judgment, and demonstrate 
judicial temperament.”114 The Supreme Court review measures get at 
these considerations only very indirectly and imprecisely. The various 
measures, though, can help us identify distinct types of judges. These 
identifications can then be used, when combined with normative 
arguments, to evaluate different judges for different purposes. 
A. Judicial Types 
 Circuit court judges may have different theories of judging, and 
these theories can influence our study of quality. The classic study of 
courts of appeals was conducted by Professor J. Woodford Howard.115 
Based on surveys of Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuit judges, he 
identified two basic judicial types. He characterized a minority of 
judges as “innovators” who “felt obliged to make law whenever the 
opportunity occurs.”116 One judge declared that the best part of being 
a judge was “launching new ideas.”117 By contrast, a slightly larger 
minority of judges, whom Howard called “interpreters,” believed that 
“judicial lawmaking should be held to a minimum.”118 A judge of this 
category declared that he “should leave innovation within the 
confines of the particular case and leave wholesale innovation to the 
legislature.”119 The majority of judges, called “realists,” took a hybrid 
position less innovative than that of the innovators but more 
innovative than that of the interpreters.120 
 Professor David Klein’s subsequent survey of circuit court 
judges also found different values in the judiciary. Most judges 
regarded “legally correct decisions” as very important but put widely 
varying importance on having a “coherent, uniform law” or producing 
 
 114. Choi & Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner?, supra note 1, at 42. 
 115. See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM (1981). 
 116. Id. at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Id. at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118. Id. at 162. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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“just outcomes.”121 Judges also acknowledged a tradeoff between 
promptness in issuing opinions and opinion quality.122 Although Klein 
did not directly reexamine the Howard categories of judicial types, his 
survey demonstrated that judges approach their roles very differently. 
These different approaches are distinct from quality or ability, but 
they may relate to those attributes. 
 Judges are a diverse lot, like any group of humans. They value 
different things in the course of rendering their decisions. Some may 
be more ideological in their judgments. Some may be more 
traditionally legalistic in their decisionmaking. Others may be 
pragmatic. As the surveys show, different judges view their roles 
differently. Judges place different emphases on the tradeoff between 
their roles as “generators of precedents” and resolvers of disputes.123 
Judges who emphasize their role as precedent-generators might be 
expected to issue decisions that differ in terms of the features 
measured by Choi and Gulati’s quality analysis. 
 A judge’s type may substantially influence citation counts. In 
Part I.B.1, we discussed the variables that might create statistical 
“noise” that could interfere with research based on citations but not 
inherently bias such research. Here, we recognize that there are some 
systematic biases to the citation-counting system, previously 
unrecognized, that could bias the results and potentially distort our 
conclusions about judicial quality. The frequency of citations may 
capture different perceptions of the judicial role as much as they 
capture different degrees of judicial quality. This is fine only insofar 
as the judicial role correlated with higher citations is a normatively 
desirable role for judges. But the latter claim has not been supported. 
 The first role of a judge is to decide cases and reach the correct 
outcome, regardless of the opinion, and the citation studies fail to 
directly capture this role. Circuit court judges are also expected to 
write opinions in some cases, which creates the public good of 
defining the law. The citation studies may capture this measure, but 
more citations do not necessarily imply better opinions, because this 
depends on the definition of “better.” One source suggests that an 
 
 121. KLEIN, supra note 5, at 22 tbl.2.1. 
 122. Id. at 26. 
 123. See Farber, supra note 14, at 1178. He suggests that a “judge who is willing to cut 
corners on fidelity to the record can publish more opinions,” but notes that such a judge “is also 
decreasing the ability of the legal system to respond accurately to the facts of cases” and 
degrading the overall performance of the system and fairness to individual litigants. Id. 
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opinion is cited “as long as it helps to resolve cases.”124 More citations 
could therefore be a useful measure of helpfulness. But it may also be 
that decisions that are less restrictive and that place greater trust and 
discretion in the judges deciding future cases will be cited less. If one 
believed that decisions permitting such discretion were good ones, the 
citation-counting results could be underinclusive.125 
 Especially clear decisions might also produce fewer citations 
because of litigant case selection effects. The established Priest-Klein 
hypothesis suggests that only the difficult cases at the margin go to 
court, whereas the easy cases are settled.126 An opinion that sets out a 
clear governing rule for future decisions would produce fewer 
marginal cases than one that establishes a more ambiguous rule. The 
ambiguous rule would be cited more often because it yields more 
cases, but it would not necessarily be the preferred rule, nor would its 
creating judge be the preferred judge. 
 Other decision characteristics might influence citations but not 
necessarily be desirable. Simple writing style could affect citations in 
ways that are not particularly socially valuable.127 For example, one 
might expect the addition of dicta to an opinion to increase its citation 
counts, but this is not necessarily considered a positive addition.128 
Perhaps longer opinions are more often cited due simply to their 
length, which is also debatable as a virtue of opinion writing.129 
Unusually pithy or clever language might be more often cited. At the 
 
 124. Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 333, 340 (1998). 
 125. In a different context, Professor Vladeck suggests that “a less interventionist Court is 
not necessarily a less effective or influential Court.” Vladeck, supra note 22, at 1437. 
 126. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (proffering empirical explanations as to which cases will 
reach trial and which will settle). 
 127. See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner?, supra note 1, at 30–31 (observing that “the 
judge who invests a great deal of resources into writing a good description of the standard of 
review might obtain a large number of cites” but that those resources might be better spent on 
other tasks). Professors Choi and Gulati also note that certain judges, such as those with an 
academic background, may “write in an especially provocative and pedagogic fashion” that 
might generate high citation numbers independent of the substance of their opinions. Id. at 32; 
see also Vladeck, supra note 22, at 1432 (suggesting that the high frequency of citations to Judge 
Learned Hand was more due to the “nimbleness of his pen” than to “the force of his logic”). 
 128. See Farber, supra note 14, at 1179 (suggesting that citation counts may reflect the 
“insertion of unnecessary dicta or address issues not raised by the lawyers or addressed by the 
trial judge,” none of which seem to be “particularly beneficial behaviors”). 
 129. See David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State 
Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 357 (1997) (finding that longer 
opinions received more citations). 
CROSS & LINDQUIST IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:04:41 PM 
1418 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1383 
circuit court level, reversals of the district court tend to be cited more 
often than affirmances,130 but less deference to district courts may not 
be desirable. Choice of issues may influence citation counts. A bold 
judge who decides cases on constitutional grounds might receive 
more citations than one who narrowly interprets a statute to avoid the 
constitutional issue.131 
 The invocation standard, which measures mentions of judges by 
name, does not suffer directly from the shortcomings of the citation 
measure, but it has its own biases. The standard is very likely biased 
by extrajudicial activities. Judge Posner, for example, has produced 
an amazing amount of scholarship over and above his judicial effort,132 
which substantially raises his profile and surely makes it more likely 
that his name will be invoked in an opinion for its persuasive effect. 
This might be called a “superstar” effect, as evidenced by the 
relatively few high outliers on these measures, and it very likely 
influences citation counts as well.133 Such citations may reflect 
“familiarity” more than “quality.”134 
 Judges’ qualifications on the traditional citation count or 
invocation measures are not likely to much affect our Supreme Court 
review measures discussed above, which are based on decisional 
outcomes and substantive precedent. One can dispute whether 
citations or Supreme Court outcomes is the better measure, but that 
dispute would miss the point that they are measuring two different 
types of quality. Indeed, the respective qualities may be inverse; 
Judge Posner suggests that judicial creativity (which might be 
expected to yield more citations) is likely to increase a judge’s 
 
 130. See Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary 
Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 140 n.159 (arguing that this makes 
intuitive sense “because a reversal alters the status quo set by the district court, meriting a more 
careful explanation, and also indicates that the law is uncertain”). 
 131. There is a canon of statutory interpretation that statutes should be construed to avoid 
constitutional issues when possible. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 
504–07 (1979) (construing a statute narrowly to avoid a potential constitutional question). 
 132. Choi & Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner?, supra note 1, at 24 (observing that Judge Posner 
“writes multiple books and articles every year”). The same is true for Judge Easterbrook, 
though to a lesser degree. Id. at 25 n.18. 
 133. See Farber, supra note 14, at 1183 (discussing the superstar effect and how it influences 
citations and invocations). Professor Solum provides a slightly different explanation for this 
effect. He argues that some decisions are situated more prominently in the network of citations, 
which causes them to be more frequently cited, which in turn creates a positive feedback loop 
that induces still more citations. Solum, supra note 2 (manuscript at 16). 
 134. Vladeck, supra note 22, at 1432. 
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reversal rate, as compared to the “unadventurous judge.”135 One 
cannot evaluate the measures themselves without carefully 
considering what type of judiciary is desired. 
 This Section will discuss two judging styles, which we call the 
judicial entrepreneur and the judicial minimalist. These two styles are 
not the only possible judicial approaches as neither precisely 
identifies the “unadventurous” career judge bureaucrat type or the 
leisure-seeking type.136 Judicial entrepreneurs and judicial minimalists 
are not even wholly exclusive categories, but they set out a distinct 
contrast of approaches to judging that best enables a framing of 
different theories of the good judge. Judicial entrepreneurs are like 
Howard’s judicial “innovators,” whereas judicial minimalists are more 
like his judicial “interpreters.” We shift the semantics to correspond 
to words more commonly employed in the political science and legal 
research. 
1. Judicial Entrepreneurs.  The political science literature has 
addressed a concept it calls “policy entrepreneurs.”137 Policy 
entrepreneurs are individuals who push a new approach to public 
policy by setting an agenda for change. They are individuals “who 
specialize in identifying problems and finding solutions.”138 The 
research has focused generally on the legislative process, in which 
such entrepreneurs are prominent. In one study of twenty-three 
policy formulation processes, such entrepreneurs were important in 
fifteen and unimportant in only three cases.139 The activities taken by 
such entrepreneurs include defining and reframing problems, 
specifying alternatives and advocating ideas, and “exposing such ideas 
to relevant constituencies.140 After identifying some problem, the 
entrepreneur “must develop strategies for presenting their ideas to 
 
 135. Posner, supra note 4, at 1277. 
 136. See id. at 1263–64 (discussing unadventurous career, bureaucrat, and leisure-seeking 
types of judges). 
 137. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY 
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3–4 (1993) (discussing the concept of policy entrepreneurship). 
 138. NATHAN W. POLSBY, POLITICAL INNOVATION IN AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF POLICY 
INITIATION 171 (1984). They are those “willing to invest their resources in return for future 
policies they favor.” JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 
214 (1984). 
 139. KINGDON, supra note 138, at 189. 
 140. See Nancy C. Roberts & Paula J. King, Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure 
and Function in the Policy Process, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 147, 148 (1991) (setting 
forth these activities). 
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others.”141 They must carefully craft their arguments to be persuasive 
to the relevant audience for their ideas.142 If successful, their policy 
innovation will take hold. 
 Building on this background from politics, one type of circuit 
court judge might be styled the “judicial entrepreneur.”143 The 
judiciary differs from the political branches, but, like politicians, 
judges identify legal problems in cases and may attempt to style a new 
legal approach to such problems. Such an entrepreneur may be a 
judge who “is alert to the opportunity for innovation, who is willing to 
invest the resources and assume the risks necessary to offer and 
develop a genuinely unique legal concept, and who must strategically 
employ the written word to undertake change.”144 A judicial 
entrepreneur exhibits a certain “swashbuckling flair” in 
decisionmaking.145 Professor Howard interviewed a judge who 
proclaimed that the “Courts of Appeals should take a definite lead in 
innovating in the law—even at the risk of being overruled.”146 This 
judge sounds like a judicial entrepreneur. 
 Prestige is important to one’s ability to be an effective judicial 
entrepreneur, and it is maintained through “good use of the opinion-
writing process.”147 A judge may maintain prestige by writing a dissent 
or separate concurrence that serves as a trial balloon or test-markets 
an idea.148 The judge must not only write the opinion persuasively, but 
must make use of conventional materials to avoid being “viewed as 
reckless.”149 Like any entrepreneur, to be successful the judge must 
have a product that appeals to the relevant market and must be able 
to effectively sell that product. The development of First Amendment 
 
 141. Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 738, 739 (1997). 
 142. Id. at 740. 
 143. For descriptions of the idiosyncratic behavior of such judges, see generally WAYNE V. 
MCINTOSH & CYNTHIA L. CATES, JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE ROLE OF THE JUDGES 
IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS (1997); Berger & George, supra note 88; Cynthia L. Cates & 
Wayne V. McIntosh, Retail Jurisprudence: The Judge as Entrepreneur in the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 11 J.L. & POL. 709 (1995). 
 144. MCINTOSH & CATES, supra note 143, at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
 145. See Cates & McIntosh, supra note 143, at 710 (ascribing this quality to Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes). 
 146. HOWARD, supra note 115, at 161. 
 147. Cates & McIntosh, supra note 143, at 716. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 717. 
CROSS & LINDQUIST IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:04:41 PM 
2009] JUDGING THE JUDGES 1421 
law has been cited as an example of judicial entrepreneurship.150 
Judicial entrepreneurship need not be ideological or policy oriented 
but might be aimed at advancing a particular interpretive legal model, 
for example, originalism. 
 Not all participants in the political or judicial process are 
entrepreneurs. Professor Howard’s interviews did not reveal a 
widespread commitment to judicial innovation. Some judges are more 
passive and give less importance to the broader practical implications 
of their decisions. A minority of judges who are more aggressive in 
the pursuit of their ideas for the legal system’s operation, though, 
might be considered judicial entrepreneurs. Perhaps judicial 
entrepreneurship represents a continuum, with different judges 
having different degrees of entrepreneurial spirit on different legal 
issues. 
 There is reason to think that the Choi and Gulati results capture 
an inclination toward judicial entrepreneurship. One might expect 
such judges to be more frequently cited because they strive to make 
the law. Judicial entrepreneurs would also be expected to have more 
of their cases reviewed by the Supreme Court and, if they are good 
entrepreneurs, would likely have more cases affirmed. These 
hypotheses are generally consistent with the results found in Table 7. 
Thus, the Choi and Gulati quality measures may implicitly presume 
that judicial entrepreneurship is associated with judicial quality, a 
presumption they do not support. 
 Professor Solum effectively makes this argument. His analysis of 
networks suggests that citation counts are “likely to be a function of 
originality” in opinion writing.151 Yet he argues that this originality is 
more of a vice than a virtue, suggesting that the “very best judges” 
build on prior decisions and are “experts at avoiding originality,” 
whereas the “very worst judges may be the most original.”152 He 
suggests that it is these bad judges who create originality by using 
cases “as the vehicles for changing the law, transforming the rules laid 
down into the rules that the judges prefer.”153 Although this criticism 
seems too strong insofar as it could declare a ruling such as Brown v. 
Board of Education154 to be a uniquely bad decision,155 the underlying 
 
 150. Id. at 716. 
 151. Solum, supra note 2 (manuscript at 17). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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point is important. A judge may certainly be “too” original in his 
rulings, insufficiently bound to the rule of law. 
 The judicial entrepreneur type makes a contribution to the law, 
but the type also has its shortcomings. It embraces a form of judicial 
activism that is not uniformly applauded. Moreover, the effort at 
judicial entrepreneurship may undermine other widely held values of 
judging. In “seeking to increase their influence, judges may reach for 
broader holdings by ignoring the factual nuances of specific cases” or 
ignoring the factual record entirely.156 Thus, judicial entrepreneurship 
is not an unalloyed good, and the relative value of such judges may be 
disputed. 
2. Judicial Minimalists.  The notion of judicial minimalism has 
been popularized, though not coined, by Professor Cass Sunstein. He 
focuses on the Supreme Court rather than on circuit courts.157 
Sunstein’s criteria for his minimalism include: 
that courts should not decide issues unnecessary to the resolution of 
a case; that courts should refuse to hear cases that are not “ripe” for 
decision; that courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions; 
that courts should respect their own precedents; that courts should 
not issue advisory opinions; that courts should follow prior holdings 
but not necessarily prior dicta; that courts should exercise the 
“passive virtues” associated with maintaining silence on great issues 
of the day.158 
Sunstein’s judicial minimalism has two distinct, though related, 
aspects: width and depth.159 The width of a decision is a function of the 
breadth of the decision rule propounded in the opinion and the 
degree to which it covers many other situations and possible future 
cases. The depth of a decision is its philosophical foundation and the 
degree to which it relies on underlying fundamental principles. 
Minimalists prefer narrower opinions that don’t have application well 
beyond the case facts and shallower opinions that are grounded in a 
more pragmatic foundation than in a philosophical one. 
 
 155. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Identity Politics and the Second Amendment, 73 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 549, 556 (2004) (“It is by now commonplace that Brown was more a feature of Cold 
War ideological struggle than of discerning the Equal Protection Clause’s ‘true’ meaning.”). 
 156. Farber, supra note 14, at 1179. 
 157. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON 
THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (propounding the notion of judicial minimalism). 
 158. Id. at 4–5. 
 159. Id. at 10–14. 
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 Professor Sunstein focuses on minimalist decisions as 
“democracy-promoting” because they allow the democratically 
elected branches to resolve controversial issues.160 A second and 
typically overlooked effect of minimalism, however, is that it leaves 
additional discretion to future judges to resolve issues. By eschewing 
the creation of broad and clear binding rules, the judiciary allows 
more room for judges to adapt a decision’s principles to the particular 
facts of their cases. A broad doctrine not only forecloses future 
legislative judgment but also forecloses the discretion of future judges 
in making decisions. 
 Taking an economic turn, Professor Sunstein contends that good 
judges would “try to minimize the sum of decision costs and error 
costs.”161 Decision costs are not strictly those associated with deciding 
the case, but also include those involved in writing an opinion that 
sets forth the law. Given the limited information available to the 
judiciary, writing an expansive opinion that seeks to “cover all 
imaginable situations” could be time consuming and difficult.162 Such 
a broad decision is also likely to increase the error costs of the law 
because unforeseen circumstances will inevitably develop. Sunstein 
suggests that a “slower and more evolutionary approach, involving 
the accretion of case-by-case judgments, could produce fewer 
mistakes on balance, since each decision would be appropriately 
informed by an understanding of particular facts.”163 He cites studies 
testing the ability of people to undertake comprehensive social 
engineering and notes that most efforts “produce calamities.”164 
 Professor Sunstein characterizes a minimalist approach to 
judicial decisionmaking as societally beneficial. He does not 
universally embrace this approach, suggesting that “maximalist” 
decisionmaking is sometimes appropriate. For our purposes, the 
salient facts are (a) the distinction between the minimalist and 
maximalist approaches and (b) the theoretical possibility that a 
minimalist approach might prove superior. The results of the 
quantitative research must be viewed in light of these facts. 
 Judges are aware of different judicial styles, and some may 
prefer the minimalist style to that of the judicial entrepreneur. 
 
 160. Id. at 5. 
 161. Id. at 46. 
 162. Id. at 47. 
 163. Id. at 49. 
 164. Id. at 52. 
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Professor David Klein interviewed one circuit court judge who 
expressed his personal preference for opinion style as follows: 
If I think an opinion is too preachy, trying to make broad law, I get a 
bit leery. I like the case-by-case approach. With the broad approach, 
the rule can fail when you encounter something unforeseen.165 
 This opinion roughly traces Sunstein’s case for judicial 
minimalism. 
 The conventional measures of judicial evaluation that we have 
discussed appear to reflect an implicit preference for the judicial 
entrepreneur–style of judging. One feature of Professor Sunstein’s 
minimalism is the “constructive use of silence.”166 Silence is seldom 
cited. Judge Posner observed that the Choi and Gulati criteria 
“implicitly treat[] judicial creativity as a desirable characteristic of 
circuit judges” but cautioned that “[n]ot everyone will agree.”167 
 Not everyone agrees that the judicial minimalist is the optimal 
judge type, either. Professor Sunstein’s proposal for judging has been 
criticized on various grounds. For some, it leaves too many questions 
unanswered.168 One commentator suggests that for a true minimalist, 
“the Supreme Court would never lay down an intelligible rule to 
govern another case.”169 For others, it ignores the significance of the 
law and overemphasizes democratic voting.170 Sunstein himself is 
cautious about praising minimalism, suggesting that “it would be 
foolish to suggest . . . that minimalism is generally a good strategy” 
because “[e]verything depends on contextual considerations.”171 
 If we cannot find optimal judges who know precisely when to 
employ minimalism, it is conceivable that the optimal court would 
 
 165. KLEIN, supra note 5, at 99. 
 166. SUNSTEIN, supra note 157, at 5; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 
Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1996) (discussing the 
“constructive uses of silence” (emphasis omitted)). This is not limited to the linguistic content of 
opinions, but it extends to the basis for judicial decisions. For example, he suggested that 
Bowers v. Hardwick should have been dismissed for mootness. Id. at 68 n.309.  
 167. Posner, supra note 4, at 1276. 
 168. Neil Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1993 (1999) 
(book review). 
 169. Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Minimalist, 89 GEO. L.J. 2297, 2314 
(2001) (book review). 
 170. See Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1454, 1458 (2000) (arguing that minimalism “significantly underestimates both the legitimacy 
and the competence of the judiciary in making decisions about individual and minority rights”). 
 171. SUNSTEIN, supra note 157, at 50. 
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contain a blend of judicial types—some judicial entrepreneurs, some 
judicial minimalists, and some judges with other characteristics.172 A 
court consisting entirely of judicial entrepreneurs might be unduly 
activist and, to the extent that their judicial preferences differ, might 
produce many conflicting precedents and instability in the law. At the 
Supreme Court level, we might see cases with nine different opinions 
and no defined majority ruling. A court of only judicial minimalists, 
though, might leave the law stagnant and unable to respond to 
changing societal circumstances.173 
 Our analysis of judicial entrepreneurs, judicial minimalists, and 
other judicial types is purely theoretical. It is not yet certain whether 
such types truly exist or how to identify them in the judiciary. Judges’ 
candid answers in interviews are inevitably anonymous. Choi and 
Gulati and others have collected data that offer some insight into 
judicial types for particular judges. We can group judges into 
particular judicial types, at which point each group or type can be 
analyzed. 
B. Cluster Analysis of Judges and Types 
 Cluster analysis is a statistical tool that enables like items to be 
grouped based on similarities and dissimilarities across a set of 
variables. This procedure has been called the practice of “finding 
groups in data.”174 The procedure identifies the cases (individual 
judges) who share similarities with respect to certain variables (for 
example, citations and Reviewscore) and groups them into categories, 
creating a sort of taxonomy of judges. The method also allows for a 
measure of the distance between separate clusters. Although this 
technique does not directly measure judicial type, such as 
entrepreneur or minimalist, it does enable us to identify judges who 
apparently share characteristics and evaluate their common features. 
Cluster analysis is frequently used before hypotheses are formed, in 
the exploratory phase of research, as is the case here. For example, 
 
 172. The effect of different judge types on precedent has been modeled. Sophie Harnay & 
Alain Marciano, Judicial Conformity Versus Dissidence: An Economic Analysis of Judicial 
Precedent, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 405, 411–17 (2003). 
 173. On the need for and benefits of some judicial creativity and problem solving, see 
generally Frank B. Cross, What Do Judges Want?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 183 (2008) (book review). 
 174. LEONARD KAUFMAN & PETER J. ROUSSEEUW, FINDING GROUPS IN DATA: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO CLUSTER ANALYSIS 1 (2005). For a further general review of the procedure, 
see generally BRIAN S. EVERITT, SABINE LANDAU & MORVEN LEESE, CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
(4th ed. 2001). 
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the method is valued in the field of psychiatry, in which the “correct 
diagnosis of clusters of symptoms such as paranoia, schizophrenia, 
etc. is essential for successful therapy.”175 
 A consequence of any quality-ranking system for judges is that it 
considers only one dimension of quality or depends on the 
calculator’s valuations in comparatively weighting multiple 
dimensions.176 There are no indubitable weights to be ascribed to 
particular measurable judicial qualities; commentators have not even 
agreed on the qualities, much less their measures or weights. Hence, 
we do not propound a list of the “best” circuit court judges, which 
could at best reflect only our own personal valuation of judicial types. 
Instead, we set forth the different types of judges, so that users may 
draw their own conclusions about who is best or who should be 
promoted to the Supreme Court. 
 For our cluster analysis to define types of judges, we used the 
Choi and Gulati quality variable of citations, Reviewscore, and the 
judge’s Almanac evaluations from attorneys. The use of these 
variables, covering different time periods, limited the sample of 
judges measured to fifty-eight.177 The procedure requires that a 
certain number of clusters be chosen, and we selected nine clusters. 
Figure 2 graphically displays the cluster results in a dendogram. 
 
 175. THOMAS HILL & PAWEL LEWICKI, STATISTICS: METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 117 
(2006). 
 176. Judge Posner warns of this effect. Posner, supra note 4, at 1276 (“[N]umerical rankings 
are questionable when the rankings are multidimensional, so that the weighting of the different 
dimensions becomes critical to the rankings.”). Professors Choi and Gulati are responsive to this 
concern, though, by calculating the best judges under different weightings ascribed to their 
different dimensions. 
 177. The clustering procedure used the Ward’s Algorithm with the variables standardized. It 
is based on a program described in Matthias Schonlau, The Clustergram: A Graph for 
Visualizing Hierarchical and Nonhierarchical Cluster Analyses, 2 STATA J. 391, 391–402 (2002). 
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Figure 2.  Cluster Analysis 
 
The cluster analysis is merely a description of commonalities and does 
not directly say anything about the composition of particular clusters. 
Thus, it does not directly say which cluster might represent judicial 
entrepreneurs as opposed to judicial minimalists, though we can infer 
this information from the results. The procedure simply tells us that 
certain identified judges share commonalities on the dimensions 
measured. The resulting clusters are as follows: 
Cluster 1: Judges Batchelder (6th), Sentelle (D.C.), Seymour (10th), 
Wilkins (4th), Dubina (11th), Rovner (7th), Henderson 
(11th), Edmondson (11th), Davis (5th), Scirica (3d), 
Barksdale (5th), Alito (3d), Loken (8th), Sloviter (3d), Arnold 
(8th), Boudin (1st) 
Cluster 2: Judges Roth (3d), Rymer (9th), Randolph (D.C.), Jones 
(5th), Kleinfeld (9th), Edwards (D.C.), Ginsburg (D.C.), 
Martin (6th), Trott (9th) 
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Cluster 3: Judges King (5th), Niemeyer (4th), Higginbotham (5th), 
Boggs (6th), Kozinski (9th) 
Cluster 4: Judges Smith (5th), Carnes (11th), Ebel (10th), Wilkinson 
(4th), Bowman (8th), Flaum (7th), Kanne (7th), Wood (7th), 
Walker (2d) 
Cluster 5: Judges Selya (1st), Ripple (7th), Tacha (10th), Jolly (5th), 
Tjoflat (11th) 
Cluster 6: Judges Easterbrook (7th) and Posner (7th) 
Cluster 7: Judges Coffey (7th), Torruella (1st), Widener (4th), 
Demoss (5th), Manion (7th), Garza (5th), Nygaard (3d) 
Cluster 8: Judges Pregerson (9th), O’Scannlain (9th), Schroeder (9th), 
Nelson (9th) 
Cluster 9: Judge Reinhardt (9th) 
Circuit court judges who share a cluster are more alike on our 
dimensions of quality than they are like judges from other clusters. 
These results confirm the Posner/Easterbrook difference suggested 
by Professors Choi and Gulati. The Posner/Easterbrook cluster is 
characterized by high citations, high Almanac ratings, and relatively 
high Reviewscore measures. 
 Justice Alito appears in the first cluster, which is also the largest 
and one of the more distinct clusters. This cluster is characterized by 
moderately high Almanac ratings and Reviewscores and relatively low 
Choi and Gulati quality counts. Justice Alito and fellow members of 
his cluster are quite different from Judges Posner and Easterbrook on 
our measure. None of our cluster measures made any attempt to 
capture the judges’ ideological orientations. 
 Whether Judges Posner or Easterbrook or Justice Alito are the 
optimal choices for the Supreme Court is a separate question. 
Intuitively, it appears that the clusters may break down along the 
minimalism/entrepreneurialism distinction: the first cluster includes 
those of a more judicial minimalist bent, whereas the bottom clusters 
include those who tend to behave like judicial entrepreneurs (as 
reflected in higher citations and more frequent Supreme Court 
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review).178 Under this theory, Justice Alito was a minimalist selection. 
This is not determinate, though, absent an objective test for 
minimalism. Now that we have clustered some of the circuit court 
judges, though, it becomes possible to conduct further research on the 
decisionmaking characteristics of particular clusters, to evaluate them 
for promotion or otherwise. Further research might introduce 
additional variables that revise the clusters. Significant additional 
research on circuit court judges is discussed in Part IV. 
IV.  IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
 Identifying desirable judges is only the beginning of necessary 
empirical evaluative research on the judiciary. If researchers cannot 
identify particular standards for judging or particular quality judges, 
vital questions will go unanswered. Conversely, if researchers can 
identify those factors, they can shed considerable light on the 
judiciary. This understanding may enable the selection of better 
judges. It will also be valuable to see how patterns of decisionmaking 
vary between better judges and those deemed to be of lesser quality. 
 One important body of research would attempt to identify the 
characteristics associated with higher-quality circuit court judges. As 
noted above, the circuit courts, in bulk, are more important to the 
state of American law than the Supreme Court. After determining 
the best sort of circuit court judiciary, researchers can try to identify 
the background features associated with the best circuit court judges. 
Thus, it may be possible to identify whether diversity, prior district 
court or professorial experience, prior publications, law school 
education, or ABA ratings tend to correspond with better-quality 
circuit court judges. 
 Professors Landes, Lessig, and Solimine have preliminarily 
explored this question. Using the influence measure we have 
described, they found that measures of academic achievement had no 
significant effects on influence but that graduation from Harvard or 
Yale Law Schools had a statistically significant positive effect.179 Race, 
gender, and prior judicial experience were insignificant factors.180 
ABA ratings were significant with respect to judges classified as 
 
 178. Clusters 8 and 9 are most distinctly characterized by very low Reviewscore measures, a 
featured shared by many of the Ninth Circuit judges. Clusters 4 through 9 have higher Choi and 
Gulati quality scores than the first three clusters. 
 179. Landes et al., supra note 26, at 324. 
 180. Id. at 324–25. 
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unqualified, but not with respect to other ratings levels.181 
Montgomery Kosma conducted his own study of citations and 
Justices at the Supreme Court level. He found that the appointment 
of younger candidates does not increase their influence and that prior 
service as a private attorney had the biggest positive impact on his 
measure of judicial value.182 
 Similar research has been conducted on the Australian 
judiciary.183 This study used as measures of judicial “prestige” the total 
number of citations to a judge’s opinions and invocations of the 
judge’s name.184 Although the study reveals some association between 
prior judicial experience and quality, the strongest positive 
associations found are between prior academic experience and prior 
experience as a barrister.185 Thus, to the extent that one embraces 
these studies’ measure of judicial prestige, one may better screen 
appointees for quality on the bench. Certain types of backgrounds 
may associate with a particular cluster of judging characteristics that 
is deemed desirable. 
 Other important research would look at associations between 
judicial types or objective measures of judicial quality. We have 
discussed the theoretical arguments for and against judicial 
minimalism. Empirical evidence could improve these arguments. 
Once clusters of judge types have been identified, they may be 
evaluated on scales other than citations or other unidimensional 
standards. Perhaps one set of characteristics produces better, more 
pragmatic societal results than do other sets. These topics have been 
the subject of much musing, but the existence of quantitative data 
enables more rigorous testing of the degree to which particular 
judicial types are likely to produce particular results. The data further 
allow evaluation of whether those results are positive or negative. 
 The role of judicial ideology is a ripe area for such study. The 
virtue of ideological decisionmaking is contested. One group, 
including those like Peretti, embraces decisions grounded in judicial 
ideology. Another, probably larger, group believes that judges should 
 
 181. Id. at 325. 
 182. Kosma, supra note 124, at 368–70 & n.70. 
 183. Russell Smyth & Mita Bhattacharya, What Determines Judicial Prestige? An Empirical 
Analysis for Judges of the Federal Court of Australia, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 233, 241–59 
(2003). 
 184. Id. at 241–42. 
 185. Id. at 255–56. 
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minimize the role of ideology in their decisions insofar as possible.186 
Still others might prefer a moderate role for ideology. Regardless of 
one’s normative opinions, there is value in identifying the judicial 
characteristics associated with ideological decisions, to determine 
which characteristics merit approbation or disapprobation. 
Intuitively, one might expect judicial entrepreneurs or innovators to 
be the most ideological.187 This is not necessarily the case, though.188 
The empirical data and cluster analysis enable researchers to test this 
hypothesis for accuracy. 
 Researchers could examine the clusters of judges to see if a 
particular set tended to be more or less ideological in decisionmaking. 
The basic measures of citation influence or prestige also could be 
used to see if the more influential judges tend to be more or less 
ideological. If this is true, one might suspect that different judicial 
types serve as little more than a mask for a desire to render 
ideologically friendly decisions. As is often the case, Professor J. 
Woodford Howard was ahead of his time and actually examined this 
question twenty-five years ago, finding that innovators tended to 
make decisions reflecting “libertarian activism.”189 Howard found a 
“strong link between the political orientations and role perceptions of 
these judges.”190 He had a very small and somewhat dated sample, 
though, and his innovative research design has been neglected in the 
years since he published his seminal book. 
 Given the data available in 2009, it is increasingly possible to test 
hypotheses such as that of Professor Howard. To perform this test, 
one only needs to identify a judicial type (such as a cluster identified 
in our analysis or some other measure), calculate the frequency of 
ideological decisionmaking by the judges, and compare those two 
measures. Obtaining data on the ideological direction of the judge’s 
decision can be a time-consuming task, but a very preliminary 
 
 186. This group presents the classic “countermajoritarian” argument against ideological 
judicial action. Judges are not elected and are given life tenure so that they cannot be removed 
if their decisions are contrary to the public will.  
 187. Professor Howard suggests that judges’ ideological orientations are mediated by their 
perceptions of the policy role they should be playing in determining the policy outcomes of 
judicial decisions. HOWARD, supra note 115, at 172–78. 
 188. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9–10 
(1998) (discussing disputes over how judicial minimalism should be applied to resolve significant 
disputes and the influence of “Sunstein’s politics”).  
 189. HOWARD, supra note 115, at 175. 
 190. Id. at 178. This effect was not universal, though, and it varied by the type of case under 
consideration. Id. at 179. 
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breakdown is available from the Court of Appeals Database.191 These 
data enable a measure of the ideology of a judge’s votes, and we use 
the overall mean in the 1980s for Choi and Gulati’s top scorers, 
Judges Easterbrook and Posner; the judge reversed most frequently, 
Judge Reinhardt; and, for curiosity’s sake, Judge Learned Hand. 
Table 10 reports the percentage of liberal decisions for each of these 
judges. 
Table 10.  Ideological Tendencies of Judges 
 Percent Liberal 
Posner 0.27 
Easterbrook 0.37 
Reinhardt 0.57 
Hand 0.46 
These measures conform to casual observer expectations, except that 
Judge Easterbrook is increasingly considered more conservative than 
Judge Posner.192 The specific results should be evaluated with great 
caution. They involve relatively few cases193 at the earliest stage of the 
judicial careers of every judge but Judge Hand. Moreover, those using 
the data should control the numbers for factors such as type of case, 
ideological preferences of colleagues on the panel, procedural posture 
of the case, and so on. Future research must account for these 
additional factors. Such research could help identify whether 
ideological decisionmaking tends to make a judge more or less 
influential. 
 Yet another area ripe for testing is the degree to which different 
types of judges show judicial deference. Deference to district court or 
agency decisions is a legal command, and deference has been used as 
a metric for the degree to which judges follow the legal model of 
 
 191. The United States Courts of Appeals Database, developed by Professor Donald Songer 
of the University of South Carolina and others, is available through The Judicial Research 
Initiative at the University of South Carolina. The Judicial Research Initiative, Dep’t of Political 
Sci., Univ. S.C., Appeals Courts Data, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2009). See generally Frank B. Cross, Comparative Judicial Databases, 83 JUDICATURE 
248, 248–49 (2000) (contrasting this database to others). 
 192. More recent data with a larger sample size bear this out; Posner is now behaving like a 
very moderate judge with little ideological leaning. See Epstein et al., supra note 18, at 320 
(scoring Judge Posner near the median in the judicial common space). 
 193. Judge Easterbrook had the fewest cases of these judges with only forty-six coded in the 
database.  
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decisionmaking194 or are influenced by the preferences of the 
legislative and executive branches.195 If one preferred deferential 
judges, as some legal standards imply, it would be helpful to identify 
the circuit court judges that were most deferential. One might expect 
that reversals would receive more citations and that frequently-cited 
judges or judicial entrepreneurs might be less deferential. A 
deference analysis could compare a particular type of judge with the 
frequency with which that judge affirms or reverses lower court 
opinions. Table 11 reports the percentage of cases in which our test 
judges affirmed the decision on appeal. 
Table 11.  Deference Tendencies of Judges 
 Deference 
Posner 0.65 
Easterbrook 0.68 
Reinhardt 0.41 
Hand 0.64 
These results are subject to all of the same qualifications to which the 
preceding ideology results were subjected. The deference percentages 
do not suggest that Judges Posner and Easterbrook are especially 
prone to reverse. Judge Reinhardt, however, has a remarkably high 
reversal rate in this set of cases. Various other related theories would 
be good candidates for further testing. Perhaps some judges are more 
influenced by public opinion in writing their opinions. Criteria might 
be found for identification of judges that are objectively “bad,” by all 
of the relevant standards.196 
 Additional research might consider the significance of judicial 
clerks. Clerks bear the brunt of much of the opinion writing for many 
judges, and the empirical analyses may measure clerks as much as 
judges. Howard found that most judges view their clerks as 
“[m]oderately [i]mportant” to their decisions and that some judges 
regarded their clerks as “[v]ery [i]mportant.”197 It is possible to 
 
 194. See Cross, supra note 20, at 1500 (“Given the legal standard’s command of some 
measure of deference to district courts, one would expect that appellees would prevail more 
often than appellants if circuit court judges were adhering to the legal model.”). 
 195. See Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1483–91 (2001) (testing Supreme Court votes based 
on both legal and institutional deference). 
 196. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 431 (2004) 
(discussing such “bad judges” and their actions). 
 197. HOWARD, supra note 115, at 151 tbl.5.8. 
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investigate which judges are considered “best” by clerkship 
applicants; these judges would presumably attract the highest-quality 
clerks. One way to measure this information might be to identify the 
top “feeder” judges for future Supreme Court clerks. From 1994 to 
2003, the top ten such judges were as follows. 
 1. Luttig (4th) (30) 
 2. Silberman (D.C.) (21) 
 3. Calabresi (2d) (17) 
 4. Wilkinson (4th) (17) 
 5. Kozinski (9th) (16) 
 6. Tatel (D.C.) (15) 
 7. Boudin (1st) (14) 
 8. Edwards (D.C.) (13) 
 9. D. Ginsburg (D.C.) (10) 
 10. Williams (D.C.) (10)198 
Judge Posner came next, with nine clerks. There appears to be some 
preference for D.C. Circuit judges, but not an overwhelming one. By 
some standard, law students or Justices—or both—regard the D.C. 
Circuit judges most highly. 
 Others might empirically study judicial collegiality, which is 
widely regarded as a positive feature of judging. It is well established 
that circuit court judges are influenced by other members of the 
three-judge panel hearing an appeal,199 and they may also be 
influenced by the judges of their full circuit who are not present on 
the panel.200 Howard emphasizes that it is problematic to assume that 
“votes accurately mirror individual attitudes on collegial courts, 
where give and take is also expected.201 Consequently, it might be 
possible to see which judges are most affected by the preferences of 
other panel members. This could provide a more refined test of 
individual judge independence than the one that Professors Choi and 
Gulati offer. 
 
 198. “Feed Me, Stephanie Seymour!”: Supreme Court Feeder Judge Rankings, UNDERNEATH 
THEIR ROBES, Aug. 17, 2004, http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com/main/2004/08/feed_me_ 
seymour.html. 
 199. See sources cited supra note 17. 
 200. Individual panels face some risk of reversal by their full circuit. See generally Tracey E. 
George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. 
L. REV. 213 (1999) (discussing en banc review). 
 201. HOWARD, supra note 115, at 171. 
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 Researchers might also study litigant behavior. Judges cannot 
set agendas, which are driven by the litigants who choose to bring the 
particular cases to the appellate courts. Such litigants might be 
expected to be strategic in deciding which cases to pursue on 
appeal.202 A judge’s characteristics could be an important part in this 
strategy; an aggressive litigant might prefer to bring a test case before 
a judicial entrepreneur, whereas a respondent might prefer to settle 
such a case. A litigant seeking to change the content of the law would 
very likely benefit from receiving a favorable opinion from a judge 
who is likely to yield more citations. 
 Research at the district court level could also be very helpful. 
The probability of elevation from the district court to the circuit court 
level is higher than the probability of elevation from a circuit court to 
the Supreme Court.203 Ideology is relatively less important for circuit 
court appointments. Hence, Professors Choi and Gulati’s objective of 
identifying promotion candidates may be better suited to an 
evaluation of district court judges than circuit court judges. The 
criteria could include measures like Choi and Gulati’s citation test 
and circuit court reversal rates. Assessments of the district court 
judiciary would also have to include trial management ability, and the 
attorneys’ evaluations might be more valuable here. All arguments 
for the value of measuring circuit court quality, independent of 
promotion, also counsel for evaluating district court judges. As the 
ideal district court judges are identified, it may become easier to 
identify prospective district court judges who best fulfill the desired 
criteria. 
 Although the research that has evaluated circuit court judges 
has immediate value and might be used to assess Supreme Court 
appointments, its greatest value lies in its potential to spawn 
additional research on these judges. The vast bulk of empirical 
research has analyzed the judges only for their presumed ideological 
interests, as reflected by the appointing president’s party or in the 
more precise point scores we have discussed in this Article. 
Ideological preferences and personal background do not explain 
everything about judicial outcomes, though. Moreover, the research 
 
 202. For a discussion of this theory, see Cross, supra note 20, at 1491–94. 
 203. See Daniel Klerman, Commentary, Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 455, 461 (1999) (reporting that during the 1990s, the probability of circuit court 
judge promotion to the Supreme Court was 3 percent and the probability of district court judge 
promotion to the circuit court was 6 percent). 
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has generally tested only the ideological outcome of a judge’s 
decision, without any consideration for the content of the opinion and 
its significance as an influential precedent for future holdings. Studies 
such as citation analyses provide a starting point for research on the 
content of opinions, which is far more politically significant than the 
mere outcome of a case. Thus, this data may be useful to a variety of 
judicial studies unrelated to Supreme Court appointments. 
CONCLUSION 
 Ultimately, we embrace Professors Choi and Gulati’s general 
research program, which pursues quantitative measurements for 
judicial characteristics. Like any seminal effort, their approach does 
not provide the ultimate answer for judicial evaluation, but it offers 
an excellent starting point. Their tremendous data collection effort 
will be of great value to future researchers. Their insights also 
advance the ball considerably for research on relative judicial 
aptitude. With their data, one can better understand the nature of 
different judges and draw conclusions about their comparative 
quality. 
 The quantitative metrics of the research for circuit court judges 
do not unambiguously measure the features of judicial quality. 
Productivity, independence, and citation frequency tell something 
about the nature of a judge’s opinions, but not necessarily whether 
the judge is particularly meritorious. Given that there are different 
types of judges with differing concepts of judging, the existing scales 
may only measure leading judges of a certain type—and that type 
might not be preferable for the circuit courts or for the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Determining which particular type may indeed be preferable 
requires a more extensive theoretical analysis than researchers have 
conducted. The evaluation of circuit court judges must account for 
the different theories and practices of judging on the courts. 
 By combining data sources on circuit court judges, researchers 
can begin to identify patterns relevant to an assessment of the judges’ 
qualities. One can descriptively differentiate judges based on their 
judicial types. Those who embrace a Solumonic vision of judicial 
quality can try to identify the characteristics of judges who fit their 
model and then better determine which judges possess those 
characteristics. 
 Because different judicial types exist, academics cannot 
objectively identify the best judges. It is important to advance the 
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discussion beyond obvious judging values that cannot be tested and 
therefore offer little practical value. Subjective commentators may 
applaud (or denigrate) a particular judge, but such assessments may 
simply reflect a bias of the commentator. Academics can provide 
additional value by presenting quantitative analyses measuring 
judges’ features, which can help policymakers and others ascertain 
who they believe the best judges are. 
